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This is the product of the first research project since the research partnership between the 
West Midlands Arts and the Centre for the Study of Cultural Policy, the University of 
Warwick, has been launched.  The partnership is intended to advance our knowledge in 
cultural policy with a regional emphasis, by exploring various policy issues which have been 
under-researched.  However, the views of the paper and any inaccuracy found in it are solely 
the responsibility of the author. 
 
To most people in English-speaking countries, ‘cultural policy’ may be an unfamiliar term.  
This is in line with the usage of the term in Europe, to which we aim to extend our scope of 
research and teaching.  In fact, this also reflects a newly developed idea in practice in the UK, 
as elsewhere, to broaden the conventional focus of policy on the so-called ‘arts’, so as to 
embrace a variety of other relevant areas of activities which bring intellectual challenge, 
stimulus, inspiration, entertainment, and joy to our cultural life in constructive as well as 
deconstructive ways.  At the Centre we are committed to including in our enquiry popular, 
commercial culture, cultural industries, which are largely unsubsidised areas, and also media, 
craft, museums, built heritage and libraries, which are traditionally funded by bodies other 
than the Arts Council of Great Britain (now the Arts Councils of England, Scotland and 
Wales) in the United Kingdom.   
 
However, in this paper, I use the terms ‘culture’ and ‘culture and the arts’ interchangeably.  
This does not mean the former excludes the arts.  It is simply for the sake of brevity.  It does 
not mean, either, that the latter distinguishes the two.  It is mainly to follow the convention in 
the documents which I consult. 
 
I am indebted to numerous people in realising this research project.  West Midlands Arts and 
School of Theatre Studies, University of Warwick, where the Centre is located, are the main 
supporters to whom my first thanks go.  Earlier ideas of the paper were developed through 
teaching postgraduate students in European Cultural Policy and Administration at the 
University, to whom I owe a great opportunity for elaborating my arguments.   
 
I would like to express my special thanks to those people who generously gave time to talk 
and who provided written information as I requested.  Christopher Gordon, who has been at 
the forefront of regional development, has been extremely helpful in allowing me access to 
publication not easily obtainable, and in providing me with his fascinating account of the 
cultural blossoming he has seen over the years in English regions.  Oliver Bennett has always 
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been a supportive and considerate colleague, who encouraged my work and gave thoughtful 
comments to the draft of the paper.  I am grateful to Michael Elliott and Felicity Harvest for 
their suggestion that ‘delegation’ of clients from the Arts Council to the Regional Arts Boards 
is only one component of decentralisation.  Without their remarks, this paper could have been 
much narrower in scope and missed out other aspects of decentralisation which are of 





In publishing in this new format, I have made some grammatical corrections to the original 























In the UK, ‘decentralisation’ and ‘devolution’ in general terms sometimes but not exclusively 
refer to the relationships between the UK government and Scotland and Wales.  This paper 
only deals with England, even though the term ‘Britain’ appears from time to time, for the 
government relationship with Scotland and Wales is a highly political matter, beyond the 






























This paper examines the theoretical and practical issues related to ‘decentralisation’ in 
cultural policy, with a particular focus on the British experience.  It consists of three major 
parts, in which each of the following is developed: 
• a conceptual framework for the discussion of ‘decentralisation’ in the context of cultural 
policy (Part 1); 
• the examination of decentralisation in British cultural policy (Part 2);  
• the analysis of the problems which decentralisation in British cultural policy has 
experienced (Part 3); 
 
This report aims to provide different readerships with: 
• concepts and theories on decentralisation which are applicable to cultural policy of many 
nations as well as of Britain, to be used for discussion by officers in cultural policy 
making and decision-makers in cultural institutions, and also by researchers and students 
of cultural policy (Part 1 & 3); 
• a comprehensive documentation of the practical problems and institutional issues in 
decentralisation policy implementation which British cultural policy has been 
experiencing, which may be of particular relevance to practitioners in Britain (Part 2); 
• some of the problems in cultural policy with wider implications for public policy and 
administration in Britain, which may be of interest for researchers in politics and public 
administration (Part 3); 
 
The key findings of the report are summarised as follows (see Conclusion for a longer version 
of summary) :  
 
PART 1: THEORIES ON DECENTRALISATION   
Part 1 identifies different meanings of the term (Table 1.1 in Appendix B), values attached to 
decentralisation, and a variety of strategies for spatial diffusion of cultural activities (Table 
2.1 and 2.2 in Appendix B).   
 
♦ Decentralisation has at least three aspects; cultural, fiscal, and political (Table 1.1 in 
Appendix B). 
 Cultural decentralisation is a policy objective, concerned with inequality in cultural 
opportunities among people, which derives from geographical, socio-economic, and 
cultural divisions of the population.  
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 Fiscal decentralisation is about disparity of public expenditure.  Disparity can be 
found among; 
1. different geographical localities public expenditure is made for (eg per capita 
spending in the capital vs in the regions),  
2. different public authorities in charge of funding (eg spending by central 
government vs local government), and  
3. different groups of cultural producers subsidy is provided for (eg subsidy for 
European- vs non-European-origin arts). 
 Political decentralisation is about the diffusion of political and administrative power 
for decision-making and implementation in cultural policy. 
♦ The scope of this paper is limited to cultural decentralisation in relation to geographical 
diffusion of cultural provision, and political decentralisation. 
♦ There is a need to theorise the issue of fair distribution of publicly-financed 
cultural goods and services. 
 
PART 2: DECENTRALISATION IN BRITISH CULTURAL POLICY 
Part 2 describes the historical development of cultural and political decentralisation in Britain.  
Focus is given to RAA/RABs and local authorities, and building-based, producing, repertory 
theatres in the West Midlands.  The case study on the theatres is to show the impact of the 
changes in the arts funding system and in central-local government politics on the arts. 
 
♦ There have been two major attempts (the Glory of the Garden strategy and the Wilding 
Review reform) to transfer power from the Arts Council to the RAA/RABs (Table 5.1 in 
Appendix B).  Neither, however, has been successful in achieving the initial objective of 
cultural decentralisation. 
♦ Local authorities have become major contributors to the arts over the decades, particularly 
in recent years through urban regeneration, to which it has been recognised that culture 
can make a contribution. 
♦ It is difficult to assess the extent to which arts provision has suffered from the changing 
relationship between central and local government since 1979, for arts provision is a 
marginal area in government.  But in general arts budgets have been squeezed.       
♦ The theatre sector was against delegation for various reasons, but the theatres examined 
acknowledge some advantages of being regionally-funded, including the RABs’ ability to 
negotiate with local authorities.   
♦ The financial difficulty of the local authorities has hit the theatres in general, and smaller 
ones in particular. 
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PART 3:  DISCUSSION 
Part 3 discusses some of the key issues in political and cultural decentralisation in British 
cultural policy.   
 
♦ As to political decentralisation, the issues of accountability and division of labour are 
highlighted; 
 As RAAs required a fair share of power and responsibility in cultural policy, diversity 
and flexibility of the regional bodies had to be traded-off.  The concept of 
accountability is the key to understanding such a process. 
 RABs’ relationship with local authorities is being challenged, as their accountability 
to the locally elected bodies involves few tangible obligations and requirements.  If 
the RABs are to remain accountable to the Arts Council and local authorities equally, 
there is a potential for conflict. 
 Making RABs accountable to the general public is another issue in and beyond 
cultural policy per se. 
 Another source of problem for political decentralisation is the lack of clarity in the 
division of labour among the Arts Council, RAA/RABs, and local authorities.  The 
division has been conceived in two ways;- 1) in functional terms, and 2) in terms of 
the kinds of arts supported.  Neither of these has been practically useful. 
 As a result, the divisions of the roles in cultural policy between different authorities 
have not been well-defined. 
♦ As to cultural decentralisation, the key to its success is to define the concept of equality. 
 Equality can be formulated in terms of full equality attainment, and a guarantee of 
minimum standards.  Each would require a different objective and direction for policy 
planning. 
 If ‘full equality’ is chosen, it is necessary to elaborate its meaning further.  The 
interpretation of the term includes equality of access (or cost), equality of use, and 
equality of outcome. 
♦ Other issues discussed include the changing significance of geography and demography 
for cultural institutions. 
♦ The relationship between political and cultural decentralisation is found to be 
contradictory or difficult to accommodate in one policy, to dispute a prevalent view that 
the two types of decentralisation go hand in hand. 
 
The report concludes that decentralisation in cultural policy, despite its apparent significance 
on policy agendas, has lacked clear meanings and concepts for measurement, on which policy 
planning must be based.  There is a need to clarify and prioritise conflicting values and 
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objectives relating to decentralisation.  This study contributes to offering alternative 
































Decentralisation has assumed the status of norm in cultural policy in many nations.  For any 
government of today, it is extremely difficult to ignore the ideal of ‘culture for all’, which is 
stated, albeit in ambiguous terms, in charters and principles on which cultural policy is based.  
In Britain, too, for example, the ideal has been enshrined in the objectives of arts funding 
bodies across the board.  Lord Keynes, in the announcement of the inauguration of the Arts 
Council, spoke of the importance of decentralisation ahead of his concern with ‘London 
first’: 
“We of the Arts Council are greatly concerned to decentralise and disperse the dramatic and 
musical and artistic life of the country,...But it is also our business to make London a great 
artistic metropolis, a place to visit and to wonder at” (Keynes 1945). 
 
However, it has often been argued that decentralisation of the arts was given only secondary 
concern on the policy agenda of the Arts Council of Great Britain (ACGB undated a; 
Hutchison 1982a, chapter 4).  The 1980s and 1990s have seen twists and turns of the policy 
objectives due partly to the changing cultural map of Britain and to the new institutional 
arrangements in policy-making in Britain not only for culture but across public services.   
 
Frequently, policy change in the arts and culture since 1979 is associated with the lowered 
level of public funding and the introduction of enterprise culture.  It may well be that the 
financial constraint imposed on the arts, coupled with the upgrade in management techniques 
and arts organisations, have been widely observed.  However, for the arts in the region, the 
political and economical environment in which they operate has become more complex and 
has posed more problems than for so-called national institutions, because of the changes 
mentioned above.  This paper is an attempt to identify the changing nature of the 
environment for the arts in the region, and thereby to provide a closer examination of policy 
alterations for the arts since 1979, which have largely remained impressionistic and 
journalistic. 
 
It is also my hope that this paper will be a start in forging links between cultural policy 
research and wider public policy writings, where the former has had a very marginal place, 
indeed if any in the latter.  This will be done particularly by exploring changes in cultural 
policy in local authorities in relation to Conservative Governments’ programmes that have 
affected them in many public policy areas in a way and to a degree unmatched by any 
previous attempt to change policy in the Post-war era. 
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For these purposes, the paper will start with examining various concepts and theories related 
to decentralisation from various angles in Part 1.  Some British readers may find that some of 
the concepts introduced are awkwardly or even wrongly located in the discussion, as I will 
use the terms in a widest sense as possible at that stage.  Some might also feel the term 
‘access’ or ‘accessiblity’ in place of decentralisation should be employed.   My intention in 
undertaking the exercise in theoretical dimension in Part 1 is to provide us with a panoramic 
view to the whole discourse on decentralisation, both at home and abroad, under which the 
British experiences in cultural policy will be placed.  My other objectives of this paper 
include, as was mentioned, to try to understand cultural policy in the context of a wider 
sphere of public policy.   Since the term decentralisation is found most helpful in facilitating 
this, I deliberately choose to use it in preference to the more familiar terms throughout the 
paper.   
 
Part 2 will describe a wide range of developments in decentralisation in British cultural 
policy.  Here my interest will be in geography, or the spatial diffusion of cultural activities 
and of policy-making, giving them especial spotlight at the expense of the other definitions 
that will have been covered in Part 1.  This will be done at a macro-level by placing regional 
arts associations and local authorities in relation to their central counterparts, followed by a 
micro-level analysis of arts organisations in the region.  This Part will show the haphazard 
nature of decentralisation, and it will raise issues to be examined in the following Part.   
 
Part 3 will return to theoretical approach to discuss the issues central to the understanding of 
the problems which we uncover in Part 2, including the issue of accountability, the roles of 
regional bodies in public service delivery, the complexity of the concept of equality, and the 
significance of geography in cultural policy planning. 
 
Obviously each of these issues deserves a paper of substantive length, and this paper will 
inevitably leave us with more questions to ask than can be answered.  My best ambition is to 
hope that this paper will provide a forum for policy-makers and practitioners at national, 
regional and local levels and invite more research effort by informing researchers in policy 









A major problem for research work of this kind, or perhaps on many topics in cultural policy, 
is the shortage of literature, particularly the writings which provide conceptual frameworks 
for analysis.  Therefore, this paper draws on a number of works from various fields of 
academic disciplines, encompassing applied economics, public finance, politics, public policy 
and administration, and organisational theories, when needed or appropriate. 
 
To obtain primary sources of information for Part 2, policy documents including those which 
are not in the public domain were collected.  Personal interviews were equally significant to 
obtain unwritten, firsthand information, and were conducted by the author between 
November 1995 and February 1996.  The individuals interviewed include executive directors 
(or in some cases artistic directors in title but who oversee management) of five theatres, arts 
officers of the local authorities that fund them, drama officers of the Arts Council and the 
West Midlands Arts (WMA), Chief Executive of the WMA and the English Regional Arts 
Board (ERAB), and Regional Director of the Arts Council.  The theatres surveyed are 
building-based, producing companies in the West Midlands.  Interviews, totaling in 17 in 





















PART 1 :  THEORIES ON DECENTRALISATION  
 
The purpose of Part 1 is to explore theoretical aspects of decentralisation and to establish an 
analytical framework before developing discussions of the practice in British cultural policy.  
Chapter 1 will attempt to clarify the multiplicity of the concept of decentralisation.  It will 
sort out various definitions and usages of the term which so far have remained confused.  
Chapter 2 will question why decentralisation is regarded as an issue at all.  Chapter 3 will 
pave the way to Part 2 by discussing the possible strategies of decentralisation in cultural 
policy. 
 
Chapter 1.  Concepts 
 
Decentralisation has been a somewhat fashionable concept in public policy debates in the last 
few decades throughout most of advanced nations (Bennett (ed) 1990).  It is widely used to 
refer to the government relationship between the centre and the local, but it can also refer to 
the relationships between government and non-government, or put simply, privatisation. 
 
In cultural policy, too, it has been ‘in vogue’, being allegedly one of the main policy 
objectives in many countries (Cummings and Katz 1987, p367). A major research project to 
evaluate national cultural policies which has been carried out by the Council for Cultural Co-
operation at the Council of Europe employs ‘decentralisation’ as one of the criteria along 
with ‘creativity’ and ‘participation’ (Council of Europe 1990a, p63; Council of Europe 
1994b, p8).  Despite its apparent importance which is internationally acknowledged, 
decentralisation is also well-known for being an ill-defined and elusive, nonetheless over-
used, concept (Schuster 1985; O’Hagen and Duffy 1989; Towse 1994, p149):  What is meant 
by the term has varied in different contexts for different purposes (Bassand 1993, p55).    
 
First of all, it is important to distinguish what is to be decentralised, since it can refer to 
cultural activities, but also to the political structure to administer them.  The emphasis of 
discussion differs from one policy to another policy.  In Sweden, the focus is on the diffusion 
of cultural activities (Council of Europe 1990b), whereas in the Netherlands administration is 
the core of the discussions (Council of Europe 1994a).  The two aspects of decentralisation 
are in symbiosis in much discussion, seeing decentralised decision-making as a prerequisite 
for diffusing cultural activities.  For example, Swedish cultural policy declares, “cultural 
policy shall promote decentralisation of activities and decision functions in the field of 
culture” (Council of Europe 1990a, p21).  In Britain, the House of Commons (1982) 
observed: 
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“In order to see the arts flourish as widely as possible there is a need to devolve decision 
making from the centre, to increase arts provision across the entire country and to encourage 
wider access among all sections  of the community” (para 2.2).  But the conceptual 
distinction between the two is important to bear in mind. 
 
Another problem which bedevils discussion on decentralisation is related to the measurement 
of the degree of centralisation/decentralisation :  Assessment is often made with reference to 
per capita subsidy on the arts and culture (eg Hutchison 1982b). But, questions will 
immediately be raised:  Can we tell people living in a region with a high level of financial 
investment have ‘more and better’ opportunities in culture than those in a region with less 
expenditure?  It may well be that the former is not yet well enough endowed with a cultural 
infrastructure and incurring the necessary investment for capital projects, or that the latter is 
rich in the provision of activities that are not expensive to run and yet are of high quality. 
 
What is clear by now is that the term is complex and multi-faceted.  Faced with such a 
definitional problem related to decentralisation, my aim in the following is to suggest a 
conceptual map where various meanings attached to it are distinguished rather than to offer a 
single definition of the concept.     
 
Decentralisation in cultural policy can be roughly categorised into three areas: cultural, fisca 
and political.  Each category is distinct from the others in two respects: one in terms of its 
location within the framework of cultural policy process which I have suggested elsewhere 
(Kawashima 1995), and another in relation to ‘actors’ in policy1 within which inequality is 
found.  Cultural decentralisation is first and foremost a policy objective and should be 
assessed in light of the policy outcome.  It is to combat inequality in cultural opportunities 
among people.  Fiscal decentralisation, in contrast, should be about policy measure, or input, 
which is concerned with uneven distribution of public expenditure among cultural producers.  
It sometimes addresses disparity of spending levels made by different authorities.   Political 
decentralisation, meanwhile, is about policy measure or policy administration.  Hence it 
concerns the power balance between different decision-makers or funding authorities.  Each 
of these has further different components, which will be elaborated in the following.  Table 
1.1 in Appendix B organises the discussion. 
 
Cultural decentralisation aims to promote ‘fair’ distribution of the arts to a wider population.  
Barriers to access in culture and the arts can be geographical, socio-economic, physical and 
cultural.  Such policy is concerned with providing equal opportunities for the consumption of 
1 They embrace those who have authority in policy-making and implementation, and those who are affected by 
policy. 
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culture and the arts for every citizen, regardless of his/her residence, physical ability or 
disability, income, social class and cultural attributes such as race and gender.  Among these 
three types of cultural decentralisation, perhaps the one concerned with geography represents 
the most common usage of the term ‘decentralisation’ in policy documents and literature.  In 
Britain, the term ‘accessibility’ is often used in discussing decentralisation2 with the problem 
of cultural barriers to the entry into the ‘received’ cultural sector as producer or consumer 
being loosely termed as the issue of ‘cultural diversity’ (ACGB 1993, p72). 
 
As such, this is concerned with policy goals and their outcomes.  The policy is often 
discussed in terms of spatial diffusion of arts-related facilities and organisations, but the 
purpose of this is, in principle, to benefit audience and population at large.   
 
Fiscal decentralisation, conceptually distinct from the above, refers to the diffusion of public 
expenditure in the arts and culture, and is sub-divided into three according to the units of 
analysis.  What is distinctive with this type of decentralisation is that it does not directly take 
consumers into consideration, but it is focused upon either funders or producers of cultural 
and artistic activities.   
 
The first is a concern to equalise public expenditure regionally for the arts and culture.  A 
typical accusation is that the centre is spending too much in the capital city (eg Council of 
Europe 1990b, p65; Council of Europe 1991, p109; Council of Europe 1994b, pp92-94; 
Cultural Trends 1993, pp11-13).  A Policy Studies Institute report of 1982 ‘A Hard Fact to 
Swallow’ (Hutchison 1982b) is an example par excellence, embodying this sub-concept with 
some sophistication.  The report examines the division of Arts Council expenditure between 
London and the English regions, and concludes that the gap is too wide to be tolerated.  This 
was to found the basis for the development of strategic policy for the region by the Arts 
Council in the mid-1980s.  It seems the Arts Council still prefers this methodology and uses it 
to stress their commitment to regionalism (Arts Council of England 1995a, p13). 
 
The second sub-division of fiscal decentralisation concerns the ratio between central and sub-
central authorities in the national picture of public expenditure in culture (eg Council of 
Europe 1994a, p57; Council of Europe 1994b, p35, p37; Council of Europe 1991, p54; 
Council of Europe 1990a, pp97-99).  Very often, the efforts in cultural decentralisation are 
mistakenly claimed with the aid of this concept, by the illustration of the increase in local 
government’s share in total public expenditure (eg Council of Europe 1994a, pp199-200; 
2 Booth (1991) argues, however, ‘access’ and ‘accessibility’ have not been well-specified. 
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Council of Europe 1994b, p37).  It may well be, however, that the apparently increased 
contribution by local government is simply due to the withdrawal of the centre.  Such a 
misleading argument is often made, because perhaps it is the most accessible figure, and it is 
thus easily picked up as an indicator of cultural centralisation/decentralisation.  Fiscal 
decentralisation, as policy input, does not automatically guarantee output level, and can 
indicate the degree of cultural decentralisation only partially and with reservations. 
 
The third is about de-concentration of public subsidies among different groups of cultural 
producers.  Concentration of subsidy is often correlated to the location of organisations.  
‘Unfair’ distribution of subsidy may also occur among different arts disciplines, among 
organisations of different sizes, or according to the degree to which organisations or art forms 
are established, and it can also occur between ‘mainstream’ culture and non-mainstream (eg 
non-European) cultures. 
 
Political decentralisation is about diffusion of political and administrative power for making 
and implementing cultural policy.  It is concerned with disparity of power between different 
spending authorities or decision-makers.  In most cases, it refers to the relationship between 
central, regional and local bodies.  It may, however, refer to horizontal diffusion of 
responsibilities among different bodies within a single tier of government, for example, 
between the Ministry of Culture and the Ministry of Education (DiMaggio 1991, p220). 
 
An extreme version of political decentralisation refers to the transfer of power from 
government to the non-government sector, ie the market, the voluntary sector and private 
individuals.  In public policy writings, examples can be found where the term decentralisation 
refers to shifting responsibilities from the public sector to the private, commercial sector, and 
to the voluntary sector (Bennett 1990, p1; Burns et al 1994; Gaster 1994; Stoker 1987).  It 
must be remembered, however, that the state has never been the monopolitsitc patron or 
provider in cultural policy.  Rather, industries and private individuals have played by far a 
larger role in the production and distribution of cultural goods and services as well as in the 
financing.   
 
The practice of devolving to community groups of interest by the Greater London Council 
from 1981 to 1986 was a somewhat unusual, but interesting, example of this model 
(Bianchini 1991, p39).  The ultimate form of political decentralisation of decision-making 
power would be the one to private individuals.  The referendum in Switzerland, taken to 
decide whether to purchase particular art works from the public purse or not (Frey and 
Pommerehne 1995), is an example of directly involving citizens’ choice in cultural policy.  
The American model of indirect art support is another example for this form of 
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decentralisation (Schuster 1985).  In this model, the federal government provides tax relief 
for individual donors to cultural organisations, whereby the individuals are effectively 
making decisions on what ought to be supported by the public sector.  Subsidising the arts 
through a voucher scheme for consumers, which has been suggested by Peacock (1969, 
1994) for some time, would also fall into this category. 
 
Political decentralisation is often confused with, but has to be conceptually distinguished 
from, cultural and fiscal decentralisation as discussed above.  Decentralisation of policy is 
usually regarded as being one of the most effective means to achieving the goal of cultural 
decentralisation with geographical concerns.  It is often argued that in order to ensure the 
spatial diffusion of arts activities, decision-making should be at the level closest to the people 
who would benefit from the policy.  Hence political decentralisation supplements cultural 
decentralisation, or the two are complementary.  As the concern with cultural decentralisation 
has increased, political decentralisation has accordingly received serious attention in cultural 
policy discussions.3  While it is possible and legitimate to regard political decentralisation as 
a policy goal in its own right in the discourse of democracy and politics, the basic stance of 
this paper is confined to my model for cultural policy analysis (Kawashima 1995) that policy 
administration is a means for achieving policy objectives. 
   
The degree of fiscal decentralisation between spending authorities is employed to indicate 
that of political decentralisation.  It is important, however, to note that money does not tell 
the whole story in the relationships between governmental units.  In examining the function 
and the role of ‘sub-central government’ in British politics, Rhodes (1992) identifies 
resources central to exchange within sub-national government.  They deserve to be 
introduced at some length, as they will help in our understanding of political decentralisation 
in cultural policy.  He lists them as follows (Rhodes 1992, pp90-91): 
1. authority - the mandatory and discretionary rights to carry out functions or services 
commonly vested in and between public sector organisations by statute or other 
constitutional means,  
2. money - the funds raised by a public sector / political organisation from taxes ( or 
precept), service charges or fees, borrowing, or some combination thereof,  
3. legitimacy - access to public decision-making structures and the right to build public 
support conferred either by the legitimacy deriving from election or by other 
accepted means,  
4. information - the possession of data and to control over either its collection or its 
dissemination or both, and  
3 The British case will be described in 4.3 in Chapter 4, and in Chapter 5. 
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5. organisation - the possession of people, skills, land, building materials and equipment 
and hence the ability to act directly rather than through intermediaries. 
 
The range of the items listed suggests that money transfer from centre to local would not 
necessarily involve the discretionary power to spend it, not to mention overall autonomy in 
decision-making.  Furthermore, in practice, the different mix of these resources, in 
conjunction with the ‘rules of the game’ and the strategies of actors (Rhodes 1992, pp91-94) 
would determine the degree of political decentralisation in cultural policy.  The mix of all 
these elements would be complex;  A plethora of political decentralisation to different 
degrees would emerge on a continuum of ‘central-local relationship spectrum’. 
 
Despite the existence of conceptual demarcations elaborated in the above discussion, those 
variously sub-divided concepts of decentralisation are used, in practice, in a non-mutually 
exclusive way and that is for good reason.  For example, subsidy disparity between 
producers—national organisations based in the capital, and those in the regions—is 
inextricably presented in conjunction with the examination of spending between the regions.  
Also, the different types of decentralisation serve each other.  For example, cultural 
decentralisation cannot be achieved, arguably, without political decentralisation.  Fiscal 
decentralisation is part of political as well as cultural decentralisation.  Concepts are distinct, 
but practical discussions do not always allow them to be neatly pigeonholed. 
 
This being the case, mapping out the various meanings of decentralisation in some detail has 
provided a better understanding of the differences that exist both in policy programmes, and 
in the changes of administrative structure, which have been loosely bundled under the name 
of ‘decentralisation’ in cultural policy. It has also been made clear that despite its definitional 
problems, this is a concept which has been leading debates on, and practice in, cultural policy 
in many nations.  In particular, it is hoped that cultural decentralisation in geography and 
political decentralisation between different levels of public bodies in cultural policy, which is 
my focus in this paper as has been noted in the Introduction, are now solidly situated in the 
whole picture and in relation to other relevant concepts.  It would be an interesting challenge 
to deal with different aspects of cultural decentralisation together with a macro perspective 
and  examine the issue of ‘fairness’ in subsidy distribution.  The scope of the paper is, 
however, limited to geography in cultural provision and to the politics relevant to it.  For the 
purposes of the paper, therefore, ‘cultural decentralisation’ will simply refer to the 
geographical version of cultural diffusion unless otherwise specified, and ‘political 




















Chapter 2  Values 
 
Decentralisation needs more theoretical examination before we begin to observe practice in 
this area of British cultural policy in Part 2:  It is a question of why we need to, if at all, care 
about decentralisation. 
 
In fact, the value of decentralisation itself—whether cultural, fiscal or political—is rarely 
questioned, and it is frequently taken a priori to have an intrinsic merit as policy.  Presumably 
the geographical dispersal of the arts is important because it enhances some values that the 
democratic society of today thinks highly of.  Also, it is presumed that decentralisation in 
organisational structure in cultural policy making and administration matters because 
decentralised structures are more effective in bringing about cultural decentralisation than a 
centralised structure, and they therefore serve societal values in ‘better’ and more ‘desirable’ 
ways.    
 
It seems that not only definitions but also the values of decentralisation have remained under-
theorised.  As a result, decentralisation policy becomes normative, with few convincing 
arguments to back it up.  A lack of theoretical dimension in decentralisation policy also 
allows simplistic assumptions.  It is a prima facie doctrine that political decentralisation is 
one of the priorities of cultural policy because of the direct link assumed between political 
and cultural decentralisation.   
 
As will be shown, a definitive explanation for the values of decentralisation is not possible.  
It is not accordingly the prime intention of this chapter.  Rather, I will aim to review existing 
theories on decentralisation to build another layer of theoretical foundation in addition to the 
one relating to definitions, on which the findings and discussion in the following chapters 
will be based.   It is hoped that the summary of theories on decentralisation will at least help 
to identify the overarching values of society such as ‘equality’ which decentralisation in 
cultural policy is to address. 
   
2.1  Cultural Decentralisation   
 
To begin with, the value of cultural decentralisation may look beyond question.  To put it 
simply, one of the basic values of modern, liberal democratic societies is, in principle, to 
achieve equality (Le Grand et al 1992), though it might look this has been abused or eroded 
in practice in recent years.  Cultural decentralisation can be deemed necessary for this 
purpose and accordingly the value should guide public policy formulation, although there are 
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more basic values to be achieved, which should underlie policy goals, such as ‘efficiency’ (in 
economics terms) and individual choice and freedom (Le Grand et al 1992).  The relationship 
between the values and public policy is, however, much more complicated than it may have 
sounded in the above:  The values provide rationales for the State’s activism and they become 
the objectives of policy.  Policy in turn functions to achieve the values and it influences them.  
In other words, to achieve equality in culture—the definition of which will be discussed in 
Chapter 9—requires government intervention in the market which would otherwise behave to 
create, retain or exacerbate inequality.  Thus optimising equality must be one of the main 
objectives and principles of cultural policy.  This is the mechanism by which cultural 
decentralisation is legitimatised as a policy objective.  But equally the forms of policy 
impinge upon the value of equality:  One of the classic arguments against public funding for 
the arts is that it tends to subsidise the activities of the better-off who are dominant audience, 
and that it thus perpetuates (or promotes) inequality among different socio-economic groups 
of population. 
 
Literature in economics has not so far shed light on the above value, or on the question of 
how the provision in the arts and culture should be distributed.  Cultural economics has 
argued rationale for public expenditure in cultural policy primarily on ‘efficiency’ grounds.  
For economists, efficiency is defined as “making the best use of limited resources given 
people’s taste” (Barr 1993, p72), or conceptualised as the question of how much service and 
benefits should be produced with limited resources (Le Grand et al 1992).  The State’s 
intervention is necessary because arts and culture are ‘semi-public goods’ which the market 
will produce inefficiently, if at all.  They are public in that they produce national prestige and 
identity, have externalities such as the spill-over effect from direct consumers (audience) to 
wider society and provide option demand (even though one does not go to a theatre, its 
existence promises an opportunity).  Goods with such attributes cannot be efficiently (that is, 
to a desirable extent with given resources) provided in the market, hence they are in need of 
state subvention (Towse 1994). 
 
Cultural economics literature has largely stopped here and barely touched upon the issue of 
equity, except for a few, brief statements (eg Lingle 1992, pp22-23).  When it comes to the 
question of the ways in which the produced goods should be distributed, economic arguments 
become scarce and thin.  This is not very surprising, given the similar state of welfare 
economics which cultural economics has looked to as a model (Khakee 1988, p1).  Neo-
classical economists have traditionally shied away from this issue which involves the ethical 
value judgement of fairness and justice.  They claim it to be outside of their professional 
remit (Le Grand et al 1992, pp15-16) despite the fact that the distributional aspect of public 
finance is often a major point of controversy in public policy (Musgrave and Musgrave 1974, 
 13
p11).  As such no reasonable consensus has been reached as to the measurement of the 
concept.  As Duffy (1992, p46) points out, however, many of the collective benefits stressed 
on the grounds of efficiency are not actually realised when participation is low in practice.  It 
follows, as O’Hagan and Duffy (1989) argue, equity case should be tackled in conjunction 
with, and not in isolation from, efficiency grounds. 
 
Alternatively, political philosophers could perhaps help by providing grand theories of the 
State and its relationship to citizens.  In cultural policy, unfortunately, literature of this kind 
has not yet been made available. 
 
Third, as such, equity as a policy goal inevitably becomes ambiguous.  The foregoing chapter 
has already illustrated this problem, exploring various aspects of cultural decentralisation as 
well as financial and political decentralisation.  Even the concept of cultural decentralisation 
in geography, which may look straightforward, is ill-defined (Towse 1994, p149).  As was 
suggested, policy-makers seem to have done without developing the definition and 
measurement of the concept of cultural decentralisation and have instead relied upon easily 
obtainable indicators of financial decentralisation. 
 
As we shall see in Part 2 and 3, this has been at the root of the problems in British cultural 
policy.  As such, close examination of equity in cultural policy would be of great importance, 
and will be undertaken in Part 3. 
 
2.2 Political Decentralisation  
 
So far attention has been given to the value of equity underlying cultural decentralisation, 
which had been by and large intuitively understood by us, but not much discussed in depth.  
Equally, the oft-employed argument that cultural decentralisation is achieved through 
political decentralisation may be convincing at first glance, but makes us wonder what values 
exist behind the debates between centralisation and decentralisation in cultural 
administration.  As we shall see in the following, the values of political decentralisation, 
again, have many aspects which are interlinked with each other in a complicated way. 
 
Political decentralisation has largely received, if only in rhetoric, unqualified support in 
cultural policy.  There should be, we would guess, some societal values that are better served 
by the decentralised structure of cultural administration.  Smith (1985) and Wolman (1990), 
in an attempt to discover these values, have engaged in literature reviews of economics and 
political science and have drawn up similar lists of the values.  Although for territorial 
 14
                                                
politics in general, their points of argument are helpful for reference in the discussion of the 





There is an argument that decentralised government is ‘efficient’ (that is, the best in 
maximising collective welfare in a society using scarce resources), originating from so-called 
‘public choice’ theory.1  The theory is based on the premise of consumer sovereignty, which 
assumes that individual consumers are the best judges of the goods to be provided, and that 
the societal goal is to maximise the welfare of the whole population.  Since individuals have 
different preferences, divergence occurs between demand and what is available through the 
government provision of ‘public’ goods and services.  When the governing unit is small, the 
argument goes, the preferences would be easily expressed by the communities of relatively 
like-minded individuals who would demand similar public goods and who would be 
perceived by those who make decisions.  Therefore, collective welfare would be efficiently 
achieved. 
 
In cultural policy terms, this line of thought would argue that regions and localities vary in 
terms of resources they possess for policy implementation, such as financial basis and quality 
of personnel, and also in terms of needs such as the number of venues and artists and 
demographic features of population.  Therefore, sub-central units of cultural policy can tailor 
services by efficiently matching the resources to the needs which they presumably know 
better than the centre would do. 
 
The problem here is, as Wolman (1990, pp31-32) points out, decentralisation does not allow 
the merit of economies of scale on the one hand and ignores the problem of external effects 
on the other.  For example, air pollution originating from a particular jurisdiction which has 
less severe regulation would inevitably affect the neighbouring communities.  Another 
example is traffic congestion that affects numerous people across various jurisdictions.  In 
these examples, the efficiency of a society as a whole is reduced, and upper tier government’s 
interference or coerced co-ordination would be required. 
 
Wolman (1990, pp31-32) also suggests the possibility of overriding ‘national interests’, 
which are altogether ruled out in this theory on efficiency.  Equal opportunity concern would 
be one of the examples of national issues.  The potential conflict between the existence of 
1 For a good summary of the works around the theory, see chapter 3 of Dunleavy and O’Leary (1987). 
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national interests and local governance is an interesting point for exploration and will be 




There are values achieved through decentralisation other than efficiency or economy.   Smith 
(1985) and Wolman (1990) turn their attention to theories of political science.  According to 
theories on democracy, the decentralised structure of government serves such functions as 
political education, training in political leadership and stimulating community spirit, all of 
which contribute to the enhancement of the democratic State and political stability.  It is 
possible to apply this thinking to cultural policy and to argue that decentralisation is good for 
democracy and necessary so as to involve local people with artistic creation and participation 
and to promote a participatory style of policy-making.2
 
Systems and institutional arrangements in politics can also benefit from decentralisation, 
because they will facilitate responsiveness and accountability.  People’s demands will be best 
judged by those at local level who are knowledgeable, and who are attuned to the needs of 
the local community, and who are held directly and easily answerable to local communities.  
Decentralisation has an added value for policy itself.  Since local needs vary, diversity of 
policy between areas will emerge which will offer wider options for residence for people to 
choose from.  Diversity will lead to policy innovation. 
 
In terms of cultural policy, this line of thought argues that political decentralisation serves 
better to encourage grass-roots arts activities, and it ensures that artists can choose to live and 
produce creative works outside of the cultural capitals, all of which will benefit local 
residents.  Decentralised structure of cultural policy is desirable also because it is less 
monopolistic and bureaucratic, more flexible and more responsive to the needs in the regions 
(Girard 1983, pp172-173).   
  
Appealing to most people’s common sense as they might be, the above arguments are not, 
however, without problems.  Smith (1985) introduces the critical comments that local 
governance is too often romanticised and portrayed with pastoral images in a value-laden 
way.  Empirically, local politics are as susceptible to oligarchy as any organisation, and they 
are subject to the possibility of ineffectuality and low accountability.  The arguments in 
favour of local governance presumes that local politicians and administrators to be as capable 
2 Curiously, Mulgan and Worpole (1986, pp125-126) recommends the creation of directly elected bodies in the 
region which is responsible for the arts and cultural industry, while proposing the creation of an integrated 
Ministry of Arts and Communications. 
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as their counterparts at the centre in general terms and are better equipped with local 
knowledge.  This is also open to empirical investigation. 
  
What has been presented above is meant to introduce another theoretical dimension  to the 
debate on decentralisation in cultural policy.  Caution is advised in that the theories are open 
to empirical testing and reveal more questions to ask. Smith (1985, pp44-45) also notes that 
they derive from different intellectual traditions, and may not have initially been formulated 
for the purpose of explaining decentralisation per se, but may have been used for the 
purposes of debate.  He also denies the possibility of their synthesis into a monolithic theory 
on decentralisation.  Nonetheless, there is much to be gained from the review.  We now have 
a better understanding of different dimensions that underlie decentralisation in cultural 
policy.  Based on these, we shall be able to make informed judgement on the practice of 
decentralisation in subsequent chapters. 
















Chapter 3  Strategies 
 
Implementation of cultural decentralisation can take on a wide variety of forms.  This chapter 
will attempt to identify the ways in which cultural decentralisation can be implemented, and 
it will conclude Part 1 where theoretical arguments on decentralisation are made.  It is 
important to note that cultural decentralisation can be done either with or without political 
decentralisation.  Both will also be further divided to produce a more complicated picture.  
Table 2.1 in Appendix B is provided to help trace the following discussion. 
 
3.1  Cultural Decentralisation without Political Decentralisation  
 
We will take up cultural decentralisation without political decentralisation.  This is cultural 
decentralisation in geography, carried out without either exchange of resources between 
different tiers of government, or the changing of the political/administrative structure of 
government.  Such form of decentralisation can be executed, either by the centre or the local, 
by their taking initiative, planning, financing and implementation responsibilities. 
 
The centre has three strategies for cultural decentralisation without political decentralisation.  
First, the centre can set up within its structure a unit which promotes regional development of 
cultural policy (deconcentration).  Regional offices of the unit will be located around the 
country and will work regionally.  But it is first and foremost the centre which posts its 
personnel to the regions, decides the objectives and aims of regional cultural policy and sets 
standards and norms which regional offices should comply with.   France provides a good 
example of this.  The French Ministry of Culture had regional directors of cultural affairs in 
the 1960s, who were formally transformed to the Regional Directorates (DRAC) in 1974.  
This, set up in each of France’s twenty-two regions, serves as an intermediary system 
between local authorities and the Ministry’s various departments.  It is expected to represent 
‘a more flexible form of central government presence’ (Council of Europe 1991, p86). 
 
Second, the centre can build cultural facilities and arts organisations across the country.  This 
was one of the most common strategies employed in the early post-war decades by 
governments in Europe.  The creation of the Maisons de la culture in the 1960s, which were 
supposed to be spread into every town in France, is a classic example.  Helping establish 
cultural organisations regionally is to follow this strategy, and it was commonly observed in 
Europe in the 1960s and 1970s.  In most cases this involves local financing with the centre 
challenging the local, but the principal actor is the centre.   
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The third strategy, which is equally prevalent, is to arrange the touring of art exhibitions and 
performances nation-wide.  Sweden, for example, has been keen on this policy and has set up 
agencies for touring and oblige ‘national’ arts organisations to perform across the country. 
 
In sharp contrast to such top-down planning, another form of cultural decentralisation 
without any central-local contact is through voluntary, spontaneous and unplanned grass-
roots movements.  This has certainly been the case in many countries.  The spread of regional 
arts associations in Britain is a good example.  Locally-elected public bodies can contribute 
within their competence laid out by law and other prescriptions given by central government.  
In countries where control is less rigid such as France (Council of Europe 1991, p294), it has 
generally done well to enrich local dimensions of culture. 
 
3.2  Cultural Decentralisation with Political Decentralisation  
 
Having seen the variety of cultural decentralisation without political decentralisation, 
initiated by the centre and the local, we will now focus on cultural decentralisation with 
political decentralisation.  This can be divided into two:  It can be formulated through the 
transfer of power between the centre and the local.  The alternative formulation is to enhance 
the power of the local without reducing the power of the central.  Thus, while the first 
strategy involves a zero-sum game, the second is a ‘win-win situation’. 
 
As was explained in Chapter 1, the transfer of power can take on a whole range of forms, and 
can work to different degrees.  By deploying tangible resources such as money and law, and 
also intangible ones such as information, administrative guidance and prescriptions on 
organisational structures of local government (Rhodes 1992, pp90-91; Mangset 1995).  The 
constellation of all of these different resources to varying magnitudes would produce 
different forms of political decentralisation, which would be placed on a 
centralisation/decentralisation continuum.  This, as a whole, is often seen as one of the most 
important means for achieving cultural decentralisation.   
 
Lastly, political decentralisation for the purpose of cultural decentralisation is possible by 
increasing resources of the local with no reduction in the possessed resources at the centre.  
This looks similar to the case mentioned earlier where structure develops voluntarily for 
cultural policy of the local, but this is significantly different in involving statutory means.  A 
British example of this is the empowerment of local authorities in arts provision, which has 
been one of the most significant steps for cultural decentralisation, as will be further 
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elaborated in the following chapters.  A French version of this had been done for some time 
in the 1970s by the Ministry of Culture through collaboratively drawing up ‘cultural charters’ 

































PART 2 :  DECENTRALISATION IN BRITISH 
CULTURAL POLICY 
 
In Part I, we have looked at the ideas and theoretical rationale of decentralisation, and the 
possible strategies for cultural decentralisation.  Having them as a framework for analysis, we 
now move on to the description of the British case.  Chapter 4 will overview background to 
cultural decentralisation in Britain up until the early 1980s.  This will demonstrate that two 
sets of organisations, regional arts associations and local authorities, have emerged as key 
actors for this policy goal.  The following chapters will examine their performance in cultural 
decentralisation.  Chapter 5 will consider the relationship of Regional Arts Associations 
(RAAs, later Regional Arts Boards) with the Arts Council.  Chapter 6 will look at local 
authorities in order to explore their contribution to cultural decentralisation in the national 
picture which has been curtailed through the Conservative Government’s efforts to contain 
the capabilities of local government in general over the last fifteen years.  Effects of these 
changing central-local relationships on arts organisations will be more closely examined in 
Chapter 7, by taking as an example a group of building-based, repertory, producing theatres 
in the West Midlands.  Throughout Part 2, the basic approach to the topic of the paper is 
empirical.  Particular focus will be on the practical problems and the institutional issues of 
policy implementation. 
 
Chapter 4:  Background 
 
4.1  Tradition of Centralism 
 
Generally speaking, central government in Britain enjoys tremendous power in politics, 
compared to other European unitary (not federal) states (Batley and Stoker (eds) 1991).  
Parliament holds legal power to create or abolish local authorities, a fact which was clearly 
demonstrated in 1986 by the abolition of the Greater London Council and six major 
metropolitan councils.  Local authorities are also subject to ultra vires, in sharp contrast to 
their European counterparts which are constitutionally granted general competence (Ashford 
1989; King 1993, p217).  It is also Parliament that confers statutory approval on local 
authorities without which the latter is not authorised for any function (Byrne 1994, pp74-79).  
Financially, too, local government has no right to spend on capital projects without central 
government consent, a tradition dating back to the nineteenth century.  On top of these 
constitutional and administrative constraints, recent years have seen an unprecedented 
limitations imposed on local government through a number of devices by the central 
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government, which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.  At this stage of argument, 
it will suffice to note that regionalism is not deeply-rooted in British politics:  Local 
participation may be encouraged, but it is not, constitutionally speaking, meant to counteract 
the centre on an equal footing, nor historically, imagined as an integral part of government 
(Ashford 1989, p79). 
 
Not only politics but also the arts and culture, particularly performing arts and entertainment, 
have been traditionally concentrated in London.  Remarks that reflect cultural 
metropolitanism abound.  During the 1860s and 1870s, at the occasions which led to the 
establishment of Shakespeare Memorial Theatre in Stratford upon Avon, the Royal 
Shakespeare Company’s predecessor, the press of the time vehemently attacked the attempts 
to stage Shakespeare’s works outside of London which alone could properly accommodate 
performance, with sufficiently large and responsive audience (Beauman 1982, p6, pp13-14, 
p18).  The contention  
of the Times “not one in ten thousand would go out of his way to see them acted in Stratford” 
(the Times, October 1864, quoted in Beauman 1982, p6) was one of the many.  A Times 
critic of today similarly criticises the company’s announcement of its shift from the London 
base to nation-wide touring, arguing that it would have an adverse effect on quality: 
“A few (in the regions) may even be willing to trade excellence for availability....But this is 
Britain, not America.  All roads lead to London, and none take too long getting there” 
(Nightingale, 1995) 
In such a country with a deep-rooted belief in metropolis, both politically and culturally, it 
would not be difficult to visualise a number of hurdles to making policy-makers based in 
London understand the thrust and nature of regional development which are indispensable for 
informed decision-making at the centre. 
 
4.2  Tradition of Liberalism 
 
The strong tradition of laissez-faire is another feature of British politics.  The principle of 
laissez-faire, according to Barr (1993, pp46-48), derives from two strands of thinking.  One 
strand stresses the value of free markets and private property, that were advocated by 
eighteenth and nineteenth century thinkers such as Hume, Adam Smith, Bentham and John 
Stuart Mill.  Another is to defend “private property on moral grounds, as of a natural right” 
(Barr 1993, p46), preached by Spencer, which has penetrated other areas of public policy and 
has been one of the dominant principles for the politics and economics of the country.  Even 
as to the Welfare State, which may have looked to represent the State’s departure from the 
laissez-faire principle, researchers of comparative social policy have broadly agreed that the 
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British model is residual in principle and reflective of the liberalism tradition (Esping-
Andersen 1990; Ginsburg 1992).   
 
In cultural policy, this liberalism tradition is even more strikingly prominent.  Most 
institutions which today are called ‘national’ and financed by government, eg the British 
Museum, were initiated by private individuals and later taken on by government only 
reluctantly and after prolonged, public discussions (Harris 1970; Minihan 1977).  The Arts 
Council was set up with relative ease only due to the success of its predecessor, the Council 
for the Encouragement of Music and Arts (CEMA), which was in fact started as a voluntary 
initiative (ACGB undated a, pp3-12). 
 
At local level, likewise, the laissez-faire principle was prevalent, as Lord Redcliffe-Maud 
(1976) observed, “there was a traditional view that the local council was not there to engage 
in ‘frills and luxuries’” (p102).  Marshall (1974) explains that local government in England 
has been historically developed at the time of industrial revolution, by being allocated 
responsibilities for health, education and social security matters.  Therefore, until recent 
decades “they have made little of their potential as multi-purpose authorities” (Marshall 
1974, p17) to maximise citizens’ welfare and improve their quality of life.  In the arts and 
culture, local authority museums were often created by the donation of private collections, 
and local performing arts organisations such as orchestras and theatre companies were 
initially supported by industrialists. 
  
Thus arts and entertainment have been marginal on the public policy agenda at national and 
local level, and it has taken decades for local authorities of all tiers to be granted spending on 
the arts at their discretion, which was finally completed by the Local Government Act 1972.  
However, it has been noted that local authorities commitment and approach to cultural policy 
varies greatly, is inadequate as a whole, and is particularly lacking with respect to the 
performing arts (Cmnd 2601 1965, para75; Ruck 1965; Marshall 1974; Lord Redcliffe-Maud 
1976; House of Commons 1982, para 10.1).  Some local authorities were even hostile to 
them.  One would imagine the local authority of Stratford upon Avon giving generous 
support to the Royal Shakespeare Company in return for the company’s contribution in 
attracting tourists to this small town at the centre of English tourism.  On the contrary, 
however, the town had always been reluctant to support the organisation, or even nervous 
about the existence of the theatre (Beauman 1982, p180; House of Commons 1982, para 
10.3), which had annoyed the Arts Council (ACGB 1984, p23). 
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Thus, the tradition of liberalism, or resistance to state activism, has led to no systematic 
efforts to oblige or involve local authorities in supporting the arts on the part of central 
government or the Arts Council. 
 
4.3 The Emergence of the Issue 
 
As was explained in Chapter 2, equity concern is one of the very reasons for governmental 
intervention, and is hence enshrined in the objectives of the Arts Council in the Charter on 
which the Council is founded.  Arguably, in its early years, the Council made some efforts 
for decentralisation, inheriting the practice of CEMA, a war-time operation for bringing the 
arts to the nation to uplift civic morale.  It had directly run theatres in a few towns and 
managed the touring of performance and art exhibitions until the mid-1950s, co-ordinated by 
its regional offices which then existed around the country.  Also, it had operated the ‘Housing 
the Arts’ programme since 1965 until 1987/88, which subsidised capital expenditure for 
building cultural facilities nation-wide.  For theatre, it tried to promote artistic improvement 
of regional companies by providing funds and non-monetary support such as guidance and 
encouragement, albeit by promoting a paternalistic view, in the Council’s words, by “placing 
local theatres in touch with metropolitan sources and standards” (Arts Council 1965, p 78).    
 
Nonetheless, a much stronger feature in its early years up to the 1970s is the Council’s quick 
retreat from its commitment to the policy of diffusion in favour of that of raising standards.  
In review of the first ten years since its inception, the Council explicitly stated this bias 
(ACGB undated a, p22).  It stressed the need to concentrate its limited resources on the 
maintenance and enhancement of standards at the expense of ‘spread’ policy, referring to the 
problem of expense, lack of interests in some places, broadcasting as a better means of 
delivery, and the growing efforts made by local authorities (ACGB undated a, pp22-25).  
King and Blaug (1973, p13) find the Arts Council was expecting the people outside of the 
cities to be satisfied with the arts through broadcasting and amateur works. 
 
The Council’s decision to close its remaining English regional offices in 1955 was most 
symbolic of a trend towards centralism from a regional viewpoint, set against its injection of 
funds into ‘exemplary’ organisations such as the Royal Opera House for artistic standards.  
The local people were not convinced of the Council’s assertion that the closure was because 
the arts would be better promoted by grass-roots enthusiasm than by top-down delivery of 
metropolitan products.  For this was not unique to the arts policy, but was shared in other 
policy areas such as education and housing, which clearly signified the end of 
‘deconcentration’ of government structure (Rhodes 1992, p153). 
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It was such apparent centralism that mobilised local spirit for the creation of Regional Arts 
Associations, involving local authorities, arts societies and clubs, in some cases businesses, 
labour unions and universities of the areas.  They had become a ‘movement’ in the country, 
helped financially by the Arts Council and the Gulbenkian Foundation. 
 
Recognition of the associations’ role and contribution to cultural decentralisation was 
explicitly made by the Labour government’s White Paper in 1965, as early as in the middle 
of the associations’ movement, when only three out of twelve were formally established.  
Jenny Lee, the first Minister for the Arts, mentioned in it: 
“(The RAAs) can stimulate the co-operation of other authorities, and by calling on each for a 
fairly small levy provide funds with which to finance a variety of projects—concerts, 
exhibitions, film shows and lectures—which few authorities by themselves could afford....A 
network of this kind should be developed to cover the whole country.  Once an association 
has been formed it can act with and for the Arts Council in a mutually beneficial 
relationship” (Cmnd 2601, 1965, para43)  
 
The growing concern for regionalism and recognition of the RAAs and local authorities were 
noted subsequently in the first systematic survey of arts support by Lord Redcliffe-Maud 
(1976), and was still being expressed in the early 1980s at a Select Committee at the House 
of Commons (House of Commons 1982).   
 
The local authorities’ role was also increased in the support for the arts and culture in the 
same period, particularly since the 1970s by the Local Government Act 1972, that conferred 
comprehensive power in arts provision upon all local authorities, and was further stimulated 
by the 1974 structural reorganisation of local government.  They have become one of the 
major patrons of the arts, by getting involved with the establishment and promotion of RAAs, 
supporting libraries and museums, investing in theatres and other cultural facilities, directly 





4.4  Strategies for Cultural Decentralisation 
 
The above historical account suggests that cultural decentralisation in the British context has 
been made possible via three ways: by central measures taken by the Arts Council to help the 
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arts in the region flourish and make them geographically more available, by the 
empowerment of Regional Arts Associations and by the empowerment and encouragement of 
local authorities.  All the options, however, involved with some practical problems, which 
shall be examined below. 
 
4.4.1 Measures taken by the Arts Council  
As has been mentioned, the Arts Council’s policy emphasis on diffusion was explicitly made 
secondary in the 1950s and the 1960s, but the funding of major regional companies 
continued.  The Arts Council’s own planning for cultural structure in the region was, 
however, criticised by the RAAs, as lacking in strategy which would cater for regional needs 
and take into full account the regional resources (eg House of Commons 1982, Q. 532-3). 
 
In the 1970s and the 1980s, the question of cultural decentralisation (not only in geography 
but also in socio-economic classes etc, see Chapter 1) broadened its scope, reflecting the 
social issue of integrating the disadvantaged and marginalised groups of population.  Thus, 
the issue of cultural decentralisation became more concerned with stimulating participation of 
lower strata socio-economic groups, and in improving physical access to the disabled, and in 
extending the support to the cultures of non-European origin.  Meanwhile, a political goal of 
improving geographical accessibility has no longer occupied a dominant place in public 
discourse on decentralisation. 
 
4.4.2 RAAs 
The development of RAAs has already been repeatedly mentioned as instrumental to 
decentralisation.  Various forms of empowering RAAs in theory were converged into the 
devolution of revenue clients and projects in practical discussions. However, transfer of 
resources from the Arts Council to RAAs were not easily achieved for two reasons, both of 
which were related to the voluntary nature of the RAAs.  First, although the RAAs are de 
facto public, or semi-Quango in terms of funding, and semi-Qualgo (quasi-local government) 
in terms of representation and function, and work for public interests, they are de jure private.  
The organisations were set up by private initiatives and have remained autonomous.  
Therefore, the machinery for political decentralisation was basically a co-operative 
arrangement, rather than any formal measure such as legislation.  Given the wider implication 
of funding responsibilities, however, the Arts Council was not willing to devolve its clients in 
any systematic way, despite the recommendations for decentralisation occasionally made by 
the third party (eg House of Commons 1968, para 90; Lord Redcliffe-Maud 1976; House of 
Commons 1982, para 6.11, 6.22-26) and the Council’s reaffirmation of its commitment to it 
(ACGB 1979, p13; ACGB 1980, p10; ACGB 1981, p6; ACGB 1983, p6). 
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Second, transfer of power from the Arts Council to the RAAs would cause problems with 
relation to the issue of accountability.  RAAs offer perhaps one of the most fascinating case 
studies for the students of public policy and administration, as they are the meeting point for 
vertical, financial accountability, and horizontal, democratic accountability.  The former is to 
the Arts Council, its principal funder, whereas the latter is to local authorities, which have 
been engaged in the set-up, development and governance of the associations, hence they are 
partners in regional cultural policy.  As the funding to the RAAs increased and their role 
strengthened, it became an issue as to whom the associations need to be made accountable 
(House of Commons 1982, Q529, Working Group 1980).   
 
Their accountability to the Arts Council was comparatively straightforward. However, with 
regard to local democracy and accountability in a less managerial sense, or responsibility for 
regional interests, this was only to be met with local authorities’ representation in 
associations in the absence of any regional structure of government in Britain.  As the RAAs 
requested more transfer of power from the Arts Council, conflicts became predictable 
between managerial accountability and the sense of local democracy.  The latter was not 
easily reconciled, as it represented the associations’ roots and identity.  This indeed was 
background to, and one of the main issues in, the review of the funding system in the late 
1980s, as will be explained in Chapter 5. 
 
4.4.3 Local Authorities  
To engage local authorities with arts provision is another way of achieving distribution of 
local arts activities.  In the current structure, the ‘arm’s length’ principle serves to inhibit any 
manipulation by central government in setting norms for local authorities.  Thus, arts 
provision has remained discretionary as opposed to mandatory for local authorities.  An early 
idea of Arts Council’s financing local authorities was ruled out by the Treasury (Harris 1970, 
p117).  One of the disadvantages of making arts provision as obligatory would be that by 
setting standards for involvement, relatively high spenders in the arts might reduce 
themselves to a prescribed level.  At the same time, it would allow scope for central 
government’s intervention in the level of spending and the ways of service delivery.  There is 
resistance towards quantifying arts provision, a concern that it would devalue qualitative 
aspects of arts activities. 
 
Therefore, it is not easy to centrally plan equal distribution of the arts with the involvement 
of local authorities.  Persuasion and non-statutory means of encouragement have been left as 
realistic approaches  which could only be realised in an ad hoc fashion. 
 27
 28
Chapter 5:  RAA/RABs and the Arts Council  
 
Chapter 4 has provided a historical account of the emergence of the RAAs and their much 
acclaimed success in cultural policy in the regions.  This chapter is to describe the 
development of the relationship between the Arts Council and the RAAs since the late 1970s 
up to present.  Table 5.1 in Appendix B is provided to help trace the complicated 
development by listing in chronological order relevant publications and events. 
 
5.1 Devolution - The Glory of the Garden  
 
By 1973, all English regions were covered by the RAAs, and the Council of Regional Arts 
Associations (CoRAA), their representative body, was already in existence.  Endorsed by the 
White Paper of 1965 and furthered by Lord Redcliffe-Maud’s report of 1976, the RAAs 
rapidly increased their power and presence in the national framework of cultural policy. 
Seeing the expansion of the responsibility of the Arts Council, alongside the growth of the 
RAAs, Parliament had recommended devolution (House of Commons 1968, para 90; House 
of Commons 1982, para 6.11) of clients.  In accordance with these developments, the RAAs 
were claiming strongly for enhanced status and competence. 
 
Such apparent success of the RAAs and critical discourse about the Arts Council led to a call 
for the thorough review of the relationship between the two tiers of funding organisations.  
The Arts Council set up the Regional Development Department in 1974 to liaise with the 
RAAs, and began to state that:  
“It is our intention to continue our policy of devolving to Regional Arts Associations further 
responsibilities for the support of the work in the regions....15 years ago, the Secretary-
General’s report could confidently plump for raising standards and invoke the maxim ‘Few 
but roses’ as a justification...but in the present climate it would be impossible to maintain it 
and we would not wish to.  All citizens support the arts through their taxes, and all have a 
right to benefit from public policies for the arts” (ACGB 1976, p9). 
 
Without rigorous efforts to explore the alterations for the ‘responsibility’ to be decentralised, 
devolution of grant-in-aid to some organisations was taken up, though it is said that the Arts 
Council was, as a matter of fact, suspicious about the RAAs throughout the 1970s (Hutchison 
1982a, p124), and subsequent arguments were focused on its extent and the means of 
operationalising it.  A joint working group was set up and it produced a document entitled 
‘Towards Decentralisation’ in 1977, which was added to by another  report called ‘Towards a 
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New Relationship’ in 1980.  There is much to suggest strains in the relationship between the 
RAAs and the Arts Council of this period.  For example, Sims, then Hon. Treasurer of 
CoRAA and Director of West Midlands Arts stated in evidence to the House of Commons, 
“the central body tends to look at it [devolution] in terms of having something taken away 
from it” (House of Commons 1982, Q529). 
 
The result of ‘the first and largest of its kind’ (ACGB 1984) review of arts policy of the 
Council since its birth in 1946 was, however, a rather disappointing document called ‘The 
Glory of the Garden’ in 1984:  It set out the Arts Council’s decision to devolve its clients and 
to withdraw from revenue funding for some organisations altogether.  It is suspected by one 
of the interviewed theatre directors, who incidentally was the director of a devolved theatre at 
that time in the North West, that it was made in order to accommodate the grant cut in real 
terms to the Arts Council from government in 1981, while demonstrating that the Council 
was thinking strategically. 
 
5.2 Delegation - The Wilding Review 
 
However, devolution turned out to be a one-off event, and was not much followed up until 
the late 1980s.  The Arts Council’s failure to show its commitment to cultural 
decentralisation in subsequent years has been criticised and ridiculed (eg Harrop 1987, Pick 
1991).  In the meantime, frustration on the part of the RAAs was increasing, and the 
relationship deteriorating, not only due to the power struggle between them, but also due to 
the change of the Arts Council’s culture brought about by the Conservative government’s 
pressure on it.  As a former CoRAA director recalls: 
“There was mounting distrust between the RAAs and the Arts Council.  We [the RAAs] felt 
that the Arts Council was no longer acting for the arts, and was instead the agent of the 
government.” 
 
By this time, the Conservative Government which came into power in 1979 pushed forward a 
whole new set of values and ideologies into public sector management.  For the arts, there 
was much evidence to suggest the government was trying to minimise its role in the support 
for the arts.  Business sponsorship was already endorsed by the launch of the Business 
Sponsorship Incentive Scheme in late 1984.  The ideology that the public sector was wasteful 
and inferior to the market model was already influencing the corporate culture and 
orientations of the Arts Council, manifested, among other things, by the publication of ‘The 




grounds.  Richard Luce, then the Minister for the Arts, made a still oft-quoted speech at the 
annual conference of the CoRAA held in Newcastle in 1987: 
“...there are still too many in the arts world who have yet to be weaned away from the welfare 
state mentality - the attitude that the taxpayer owes them a living.  Many have not yet 
accepted the challenge of developing plural sources of funding.  They give the impression of 
thinking that all other sources of fund are either tainted or too difficult to get.  They appear 
not to have grasped that the collectivist mentality of the sixties and seventies is out of date.” 
“...beyond the arts world is the mass of the British public.  The majority tend to be highly 
sceptical about the use of taxpayers’ money for the arts”(Luce 1987). 
 
This was felt to be the final, fatal sign of the government in threatening the arts sector. 
 
The latter part of Chapter 4 pointed out the RAAs’ position at a crossroads of two different 
lines of accountabilities, which was to lead to a structural problem.  As was predicted, the 
very success of the RAAs gave rise to a concern with accountability.  Luce saw the need to 
ameliorate the relationship between the Arts Council and the RAAs and to strengthen 
accountability (Luce 1988).  He commissioned Richard Wilding, retiring Secretary to the 
Office of Arts and Libraries, to investigate optional systems of policy delivery in the arts for 
the nation, which were effective, economical and accountable.   The arts funding bodies 
believed that the Minister was following a broad ideology of the Conservative Government, 
and he treated sub-national government, namely, the Arts Council, the RAAs and local 
government as a whole, with great suspicion.  Arts organisations similarly felt that the themes 
of the enquiry were to ‘dress up’ the hidden agenda of shaking the arts sector up to bring 
forward the ‘reality’ of the 1990s. 
 
Wilding did extensive research on the topic and undertook wide consultation with relevant 
parties.  His report, finally published in 1989 (Wilidng 1989), contained eighty 
recommendations on the restructuring of the funding system and the working relationship 
between the organisations.  Some of the most controversial points he made included the 
recommendation for the massive reduction of local authorities’ presence in the RAAs 
(Wilding 1989, para 7.2, 7.8) and his distinction of ‘social’ art and arts of excellence 
(Wilding 1989, para 7.21, 7.24) which implied the former’s inferiority and the association 
with local level.  Regional arts advocates did not believe that Wilding had understood the 
dynamics of regional and local arts scenes (CoRAA undated; WMA undated), and saw him 
as typical of civil servants with a centralistic view. 
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Although Luce did not endorse Wilding’s recommendation for the reduced representation of 
local authorities, as he saw them to be crucial and substantial actors for the arts support in 
Britain already (Luce 1990a), he left office before implementing his decisions. This was the 
beginning of a very unstable period for the arts.  Subsequent Ministers inspected the reform 
from different angles, tried to sophisticate the outstanding proposal and set up task forces.  
Examinations were endlessly made around the issues of the number and composition of board 
members for the new regional bodies in particular (see Table 5.2 in Appendix B for a 
summary of different views and decisions which were made on the board structure by the 
Ministers and their task forces).  Other issues scrutinised included working procedures in and 
between the two tiers, staffing arrangements and cost-effectiveness of a whole new system.   
Consultative documents were produced, seminars held and appeals made time and again.  In 
parallel to these developments, the National Audit Office was conducting the review of the 
central government’s arts spending (NAO 1990), and the National Media and Arts Strategy 
was being co-ordinated at the Arts Council (resulting in ACGB 1993).  The Arts Council and 
the RAAs were in tough negotiation over the appropriate roles of themselves in arts support.  
In short, political football was being played among the Conservative government, the Arts 
Council and the RAAs.   
 
Even more difficult was the implementation of the delegation of clients and projects for 
funding responsibilities to newly-created RABs.  It met with an unusual degree of opposition 
from the arts sector (Everitt 1991).  Debates were held between officers of specific art forms, 
because the selection of the clients to be delegated was left to departmental negotiation.  
Generally, Arts Council officers did not wish to lose their clients who symbolised their 
power, control and posts.  Thus, decentralisation was subject to such factors as the will on the 
part of the Arts Council, that is, whether particular departments preferred to retain or lose 
their clients, the nature of the art forms and the strength of arguments made by both sides.  
The result turned out to be a fragmented distribution of funding responsibilities.  For 
example, it is difficult to extract any coherent logic that explains why regional orchestras are 
still funded by the Arts Council whereas regional theatres are now in the hands of the RABs.   
 
To sum up, final decisions were made in line with the Minister’s decision (see Renton 1991) 
and a report produced at around the same time, which recommended new planning and 
accountability systems.  Based on these, a new structure for arts funding got a new shape.  
The new ‘integrated funding system’ is to ensure the arts funding bodies nationally and 
regionally have coherent policy and clear accountability from RABs’ clients through the 
RABs to the ACE (plus the Crafts Council and the British Film Institute).  In order to achieve 
this objective, further specifications are made for the RABs as regards Board Members, 
conditions of funding, staffing structures, planning, budgeting and reporting.  In each area, 
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specific formats requirements and procedures are set out.  Communication at Board and 
executive levels is formally enhanced.  The Regional Arts Boards are fully incorporated as 
companies limited by guarantee, each much smaller in size and with less representatives from 




Through these lasting battles for more regional powers and decentralisation in general, 
however, whether the Regional Arts Boards are winners or losers is not easy to judge.  On 
one hand, having more clients has given the Boards more authority, legitimacy, presence and 
budgets.  These in turn contribute to a broadened scope and wider experiences for staff, and it 
has also enabled regional policy planning to be more effective.  On the other hand, however, 
the new director of ERAB (English Regional Arts Boards, successor to CoRAA) and the 
Regional Director of the Arts Council regrettably admit that the regional bodies have less 
independence than they used to enjoy, although the latter preferred to call the process 
‘harmonisation’ rather than centralisation.  Policy and business plans have to be submitted for 
approval by the Arts Council.1  What was described in 1982 by CoRAA as a bunch of 
organisations that varied “in their composition, functions and procedures as well as in the 
scales of their operations” (House of Commons 1982, p192) was no longer the case.   
 
Assessing the extent to which the Council acts as interventionist would require closer 
examination and inside information, but it is apparent that the relationship now is formal and 
bureaucratic, spelt out and illustrated in a number of documents and memorandum, and the 
procedures for conducting business are standardised (see ACE 1995b; ACE 1994; ACGB 
1992).  Some of the arts organisations are convinced that more centralisation is now 
happening.  So are the local authorities (eg Sargent 1996, p316).   
 
 
Another change that deserves attention is the introduction of a new culture for the Boards.  
The new governing bodies are much smaller, and the local authorities representation is 
limited to one third of the total number, while business involvement is now a must.  For 
senior officers of the regional funding bodies who were concerned with the change, this 
seems to be working well.  Arguments made at the meetings are generally constructive, and 
decisions are made quickly. 
1 Arts Council of Great Britain, in the meantime, was divided into the Arts Council of England (ACE), the 
Scottish Arts Council and the Arts Council of Wales on 1 April 1994.  
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Chapter 6:  Local Authorities 
 
6.1  Local Authorities and the Arts 
 
Enhancing local authorities’ role in supporting the arts is one of the other major means for 
cultural decentralisation.  Doing it through the transfer of power has been impossible due to 
the lack of a direct line of authority between central and local government in the field of 
cultural policy.  Thus, encouraging and empowering them without transfer of power has been 
undertaken.   
 
Partnership with RAA/RABs has been one of the most contributing factors to increase in 
local authorities’ commitment.  West Midlands Arts (WMA), the Regional Arts Board in the 
West Midlands, has developed relationship with local authorities, encouraged their arts 
investment, engaged a range of partners in local government and supported local arts 
initiatives (WMA undated, p3). 
 
It is estimated that the total net revenue expenditure on the ‘arts’ (excluding museums and 
libraries) by local authorities was £147.3 million in 1993/94, nearly matching that of the Arts 
Council (Marsh and White 1995).  Spending on venues is the single largest area of spending, 
accounting for 63 % of total spending, but individual grants to artists and organisations are 
the most common form of support (Marsh and White 1995).  Considering that leisure services 
as a whole, of which arts provision is only a minor part, are non-statutory and non-mandatory 
(with an exception of the library), an evaluation that arts provision has fared well will not be 
unduly unfair. 
 
6.2 Changing Climate of the 1980s 
 
Despite encouraging signs such as the growth rate of local councils’ expenditure for the arts 
and culture and increasing number of local authority arts officers, the 1980s was not an easy 
time.  It must be noted that the growth rate may have been phenomenal, but it started from 
scratch in many cases and the achieved level is still relatively low.  Even worse, the growth 
has stopped for some years, due to the economic recession since the late 1980s and also to 
central government’s determination for the containment of local public expenditure 
(Glennerster 1992, chapter 5; Travers 1995). 
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The Conservative government’s limitation on the power and capabilities of local government 
is well-documented (eg, inter alia, Travers 1989, Stewart and Stoker (eds) 1995).  The 
abolition of the Greater London Council and six major metropolitan councils in 1986 
reminded us of the principle that local government in Britain is a creature of Parliament.  For 
the arts, this was one of the hardest blows, as the GLC in particular was leading an 
imaginative approach to cultural policy (Bianchini 1991) as well as providing subsidies to a 
large number of organisations in London.   
 
In addition to this, four interrelating trends can be singled out.  First, central government has 
limited autonomy of local government through changes in finance:  It has less power to raise 
revenue than before and is more dependent on central government’s grants.  Through grant-
making, central government can specify on what and in what way money is to be spent.   
 
Second, by emphasising consumers’ choice, central government has effectively undermined 
local government’s capacity for planning.  For example, in sectors such as education, funds 
by-pass local authorities and go directly to end-users or their agents.  Third, local government 
has been made to change its role from direct provider of services to enabler to allow 
individuals to make their choice from a plurality of providers.   Fourth, the principles and 
practices of the business sector have been injected into public sector management (Stewart 
and Walsh 1992).  In order to ensure efficiency, effectiveness and economy, measures such 
as charging for services, contracting and the creation of ‘internal market’ have been 
introduced (Walsh 1995).  These changes in turn have been enhanced by the requirement for 
articulated objectives, criteria for measurement and constant assessment.  The public sector, 
particularly local government, has thus been experiencing a revolution (Flynn 1993; Walsh 
1995). 
 
While traditionally ‘mainstream’ service areas of local government such as education and the 
social services were increasingly curtailed and put under severe scrutiny, local government 
has developed a new area in the 1980s, that is, urban economic development (Harding 1989, 
pp24-15).1  Funding was available from Europe for tackling inner-city problems and also 
from central government grants earmarked for urban regeneration.  There was a growing 
belief on the part of city planners in the values arts and culture could bring to the cities as 
well as of the employment cultural industries could generate (Griffiths 1993).  Reports were 
produced to make the case, creating figures which was to demonstrate the economic 
contribution of the arts and culture (eg Myerscough 1988), and to present the success of 
1 Harding and Garside (1995) and Harding (1989) argue, however, local government was gradually overshadowed 
in its role in local development by the Conservative Government’s centralism and its emphasis on the market 
superiority. 
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image-building through the arts and culture in the cities such as Glasgow and Birmingham 
(eg ACGB undated b).  Bianchini (1991, p32) even argues that the erosion of local authority 
power in other areas has perhaps contributed to raising the awareness of the authorities that 
cultural policy can be an instrument with which to visibly reassert their presence in politics.   
 
It should be noted, however, that it was chiefly to large, metropolitan cities that the newly-
developed scope for the arts within city planning was made available.  In the 1980s 
opportunities for funding also became more available from the health and social services.  
This was particularly due to the development of community care policy since the 1980s, 
whereby personalised care in non-institutional settings and quality of service were 
emphasised, to which arts were seen to make a significant contribution.  Officers in local 
authorities are rightly called Arts Development Officers, who have to be opportunistic about 
the possibilities for the involvement of the arts in basically non-arts plans and projects.  Far 
less of their time is spent on the allocation of their small budgets and more on co-ordinating 
arts-related projects with other departments and agencies of the councils. 
 
6.3  Consequences 
 
It is not easy to take all these different strands together and to pinpoint the extent to which 
arts provision has suffered from the changing central-local relationships of government.  On 
one hand, because the arts are a relatively new, marginal area compared to ‘mainstream’, 
mandatory services and also thanks to the ‘arm’s length’ principle, they have managed to 
escape from the central government’s attention.  Although arts managers and bureaucrats are 
not over-optimistic about potential attacks, no significant policy change has been imposed 
upon them yet. 
 
On the other hand, it is clear that when budgets are tight, discretionary services are the most 
vulnerable.  It was estimated that total net revenue expenditure on the arts fell from 1992/93 
to 1994/95 by 5.2 per cent after allowing for inflation (Marsh and White 1995).  New pots of 
money that looked available for the arts are also shrinking, and arts-related projects are 
amongst the first to go.  The arts development budget in particular is being slashed in some 
councils because it is not tied to fixed costs such as building maintenance.  Significantly, 
policy changes in education has had unintended, but profoundly adverse, effects on the arts 
organisations, particularly in drama, as follows. 
 
First, the introduction of Local Management of Schools has made the existence of Theatre in 
Education companies difficult, whose service used to be purchased in block by Local 
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Education Authorities and is now up to marketing to individual schools.  Second, the newly-
established National Curriculum tends to diminish the appreciation of a wide range of both 
classical and contemporary works and the understanding of the craft in theatre, while 
enhancing the reading of selected materials.  Third, under-funding of education along with 
the demand for better quality service at schools has put teachers under pressure.  They have 
decreasingly little time to organise school visits to theatres or workshops at schools inviting 
professional artists (WMA 1995, p6; ACE 1995c, p24). 
 
The requirement to put basic services provision to competitive tendering made by Local 
Government Planning and Land Act 1980 and Local Government Act 1988 has not fully 
extended to the operation of arts facilities due to the difficulty in specifying service standards 
and monitoring performance in the arts in quantitative terms needed for tendering.  However, 
the criticism made in the Audit Commission’s report (1991) on local authority involvement in 
the arts, its proposal to include local authority performance indicators on the arts, a report 
commissioned on the same topic by the Department of National Heritage (Positive Solutions 
1993) and the government’s proposal to introduce Compulsory Competitive Tendering 
(CCT) for all local authority services have given warning that complexity in the arts has a 
limited scope for exemption.   
 
The introduction of CCT might, as have been suggested by the government, have the positive 
effects of helping clarify objectives of local authorities’ cultural policy and evaluating 
effectiveness of current practice as well as raising public awareness for local authorities’ role 
in culture (Challans 1991).  Whether the introduction of CCT would be feasible or not is 
certainly debatable.  But on the whole the relevant bodies are being made suspicious about all 
the admirable rationales of CCT and cautious about the degree to which the government’s 










Chapter 7:  Theatre 
 
This chapter will try to assess the impact of the changes described in chapter 4 on  the arts by 
highlighting building-based, producing, repertory theatres located in the West Midlands 
region.  They are the Swan Theatre in Worcester, New Victoria Theatre, Birmingham 
Repertory Theatre, Belgrade Theatre and the Royal Shakespeare Company. 
 
7.1  Rationale for the Case Study 
 
Such theatres deserve close examination because they provide a rich and diverse context for 
the exploration of the impact of decentralisation on the arts in general.  The reasons are three-
fold:  First, theatre has been said to be in the forefront in arguing against delegation of 
funding from the Arts Council to the Regional Arts Boards.  The reasons for the opposition 
will be provided in later discussion.  Second, all the companies in this category in the end 
have been delegated, except for the Royal Shakespeare Company in Stratford-upon-Avon.  
The Swan Theatre in Worcester, in contrast, was delegated well ahead of the other three in 
the ‘Glory’ strategy.  As such, the sector can be expected to provide diversity and to show 
different impact brought about on them.  Third, theatre of this kind is particularly 
controversial in local authorities’ support for the arts.  It is one of the most expensive forms 
of the arts, requiring stable, substantial grants in aid every year.  It nevertheless tends to fail 
to engage local politicians with enthusiasm, who may be more concerned with supporting 
amateur activities for their constituencies. 
 
Table 7.1 in Appendix B summarises the features of the theatres under examination in size, 
catchment areas, finance and output. 
 
7.2  Relationship with RAA/RABs 
 
The theatre sector’s opposition to delegation derived chiefly from the fear that delegation 
would be used as an excuse to reduce funding to it and that what it saw as disparity between 
the national companies (Royal National Theatre and Royal Shakespeare Company) and the 
rest would be perpetuated, to which collective lobbying would effectively be blocked.  The 
sector also knew that its new main funding body would have to rely on Arts Council funding 
anyway.  It was also uneasy about the quality of RAA/RABs.  Last but not least, there arose 
an almost emotional antagonism so that the proposal was felt to be insulting.  Opposition was 
shared by other arts disciplines, but theatre felt itself as vulnerable in this reform.  Dance was 
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still a relatively underdeveloped area, and orchestras and contemporary art galleries were 
nationally smaller in number than theatres, both of which could make the case for cross-
regional assessment. 
 
Theatres deployed counter-arguments in relation to their claim of national importance, their 
need to be assessed in comparison to their peers across the country, but not to the theatres of 
different nature in the same regions, or in light of non-artistic agenda which sometimes 
appeared in regional policy and the unfamiliarity of the RAA/RABs with the operation of 
large-scale theatres.  There was also a claim that the theatre in England was a ‘cottage 
industry’ which had no geographic boundary and needed to work closely with each other 
around the country. 
 
Having gone through numerous negotiations, rows and revised lists of clients for delegation, 
the transfer of the clients and projects was made into effect in 1993/4.  What has happened in 
practice is a mixture of advantages and disadvantages for the theatres.  First, in the first year 
of operation of the new system, there was a wide variety of practice for funding among the 
regions, although it has been gradually sorted out.  The same anecdotes related to the 
confusion of the first year were repeated by the interviewees: 
“Last year he [a theatre director in other region] was phoned up by his RAB and told ‘We’ve 
won additional money of £30,000 for you to do international work in our bidding to the Arts 
Council’.  They did not want to do international work..., but was told to be grateful.  They did 
not know about the bidding at all.” 
 
Some see another layer of bureaucracy having unnecessarily come into being, as the RABs 
have to rely on the Arts Council for money after all: 
“One of the key issues of my life is when the grant is to be paid....RAB then will have to ask 
the Arts Council.” 
“There is more bureaucracy attached now.  I think accountability is important for any 
organisation in receipt of public money, but sometimes you spend more time on paperwork 
than on actual business.  It is counter-productive.” 
 
A fundamental problem, as they see it, is that the RABs need to bid to the Arts Council each 
year for its funding by producing corporate plans.  This is one of the areas that provokes a 
strong feeling for the directors: 
“Bidding is made on the basis of their corporate plan but not artistic quality.  Why should we 
get penalised if they fail?” 
The RABs’ relationship with local authorities is a source of worry to a theatre director, 
referring to the practice of matching funds to the theatre between the two: 
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“They [the city council] haven’t got the money, and we’re certainly caught in the 
middle....They [WMA] don’t recognise their relationship to theatre ought to be different to 
the relationship that local authorities have with theatre-makers”. 
 
A theatre director, though acknowledging his RAB as “one of the most considerate, helpful, 
effective and efficient”, says he would be happy if the RABs were scrapped completely.  He 
unreservedly says: 
“We don’t like RABs.  They don’t like us!...They are scared of us...(because) we are bigger 
than them in turnover.” 
 
There is agreement regrettably expressed by the relevant parties, including the theatres, the 
Arts Council, the RABs and also the local authorities that delegation and restructuring of the 
arts funding system was not to nurture regionalism, particularly in light of the fact that not all 
art forms have gone through the process: 
“Any claim that delegation was a desire on the part of anybody to create a regional arts 
policy is nonsense....Approach to arts policy is now fragmented.  I may be too cynical, but 
perhaps this was what government wanted to achieve” .  (Theatre Director) 
“I’d like delegation true and thorough....It [current situation] gives an impression that the 
(delegated theatre) is rubbish”.  (Local Authority Arts Officer) 
 
Despite these critical views about the current arts funding system, which is structural and 
beyond their control, the directors have come to terms with the given situation.  They find 
relevant officers as showing interest, concern and knowledge in their works witha sound 
basis for assessment, thus cancelling out the former worry as to the quality of decision-
making at regional level.  Their presence nearby certainly creates some uneasiness, but the 
theatres are prepared to see the greater involvement of the funder as healthy.  RABs’ 
resources of local knowledge, for example, the demographic profile of population, are also 
found helpful.  They are expected to be good at negotiating with local authorities in relation 
to funding. 
 
Lastly, a theatre director notices an interesting relationship being developed among the 
theatres in the region: 
“RAB has brought us together....There was no habit of thinking regionally, (because) most 
regions are artificial....But now there is more coherent approach to common issues”. 
 
7.3 Relationship with Local Authorities  
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The regional theatre companies occupy space somewhere in the middle in local authorities’ 
cultural policy in terms of the history of commitment and relative size of the grants.  Support 
for the theatres has a shorter history than for museums, galleries and libraries,1  but has been 
given for some decades in selective areas.  Supporting small-scale, community-based 
activities, or involving arts in primarily non-arts activities, investing in cultural industries are, 
in contrast, a newly-developed type of support at local government.  It follows that the grants 
to the theatres tend to be substantial as a single ‘arts budget’, if not for the theatres, 
determined at a senior level of the councils.  But they are smaller than those dedicated to 
museums and libraries. 
 
The local authorities that fund the theatres have been suffering from financial stringency, 
particularly in recent years.  So far the theatres have managed to get grants to stand still, but 
are likely to have them reduced in the years to come.  Decisions have already been made at 
the Belgrade that the theatre is abandoning its ‘theatre in education’ department, and the 
General Manager predicts a smaller number of new productions and more days for 
performances made elsewhere.  The Swan Theatre in Worcester is even at the edge of ceasing 
to be a producing theatre or even at closure.  Even the Birmingham Repertory Theatre, which 
has been a flagship within the city marketing projects of Birmingham, is expected to suffer 
funding cuts from the council.  On the whole, the implication is that the theatres are 
increasingly under pressure to show ‘value for taxpayers’ money’ in numerical terms as 
precisely as possible so that the councils can justify their support.  
 
‘New money’ made available for the arts have benefited those in large cities.  In this study, 
the Birmingham Repertory Theatre is the case par excellence.  In an attempt to attract high-
tech related investment and intellectually-advanced industry on an European scale, the city 
needed an arts and cultural ingredient in its image-building and marketing (Bianchini 1991, 
1993).  The quarter in which the Theatre is located is one of the main physical focus of the 
city’s ambitious cultural policy, being adjacent to the new Symphony Hall and the new 
International Convention Centre.  Smaller cities such as Worcester in the region are not 
eligible for the same range of urban-regeneration funding, and the theatres in the cities have 
not managed to find any new sources of funding.   
 
The National Lottery funding, however, is a new opportunity for all the theatres here, and 
could benefit all of them.  The Belgrade and Coventry City Council co-decided that the 
Theatre Trust should have more distance from the council so that the theatre can more freely 
1 Ironically, it was the theatre sector that successfully lobbied against the inclusion of theatres in the provisions of 
Public Health Act 1925, which granted local authorities power to provide service in performing arts.  The Society 
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apply for capital project funding to the Lottery fund, otherwise it would be deemed as part of 
local authority capital expenditure regulated severely by Central Government. 
 
As was mentioned, the impact of the central pressure on local government in relation to the 
arts and culture is not easy to correspondingly identify.  Funding cuts for theatre can only 
broadly be understood in a general trend of financial difficulties of local government, which 
is due to the erosion of the capabilities and autonomy of local government.  Side-effects of 
Education Reform are, however, more directly harming the theatre sector.   
 
What seems to be clear from the above is to confirm conventional wisdom:  Producing 
theatres which are high-fliers thanks to their history and physical presence will manage to 
survive (Challans 1991, p11).  But the current financial difficulty will disproportionately 
disadvantage smaller ones within the same category, and the ones without sympathetic, 
committed funders.  Not only cut-backs in public grants but also box office shortfalls would 
follow, and those organisations in urban settings with large potential audiences would have 
better chances.  They may be, however, forced to make cuts in new productions, educational 
activities and unpredictable experiments of minority interests, which would in turn 
undermine their long-term standing.  How these trends would fit in with the issue of 












of West End Theatre was afraid of ‘unfair’ competition with a subsidised sector being created (Harris 1970, p115; 
House of Commons 1982, para 3.12). 
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PART 3 : DISCUSSION 
 
So far we have examined theoretical aspects of decentralisation in Part 1 and decentralisation 
in practice in British cultural policy in Part 2.  In the latter particular focus has been given to 
the RAA/RABs and local authorities in relation to their politics with the centre and 
administrative restructuring.  Theatres were highlighted as case studies to show the impact of 
political decentralisation on arts organisations in the region.  Part 3 will discuss key issues 
which have emerged across the foregoing chapters in two parts.  Chapter 8 will consider the 
issues of accountability and the division of labour between the Arts Council and the 
RAA/RABs which were the main sources of problems in political decentralisation.  Chapter 9 
will shift back to cultural decentralisation.  It will attempt to tackle the concept of equality 
and a geographical concern in the context of cultural decentralisation planning.  Finally, 




Chapter 8.  Political Decentralisation:  Problems in 
Implementation 
 
8.1  Problem of Accountability 
 
8.1.1  RAA/RABs and the Arts Council  
 
Chapter 4 has described the changes of the relationship between the Arts Council and the 
RAA/RABs since the early 1980s up to the present.  In sum, the growth of RAAs in the 
1970s had led to a call for political decentralisation from the Arts Council to the regional 
bodies.  This was done, however, in a half-hearted way in the mid 1980s through partial 
devolution of clients in the ‘Glory’ strategy.  The continuous growth of RAAs and the need 
for political decentralisation had resulted in the Wilding reform.  ‘Delegation’ of the Wilding 
reform is different from ‘devolution’ of the ‘Glory’ in that delegation is not one-off transfer 
of clients but the co-ordination and integration of the two tiers of arts funding bodies in 
objectives and their implementation.  The integrated structure of arts funding in turn called 
for the formalisation of organisational structure and management of the RAAs (see 5.3 in 
Chapter 5 and Table 5.1 in Appendix B).  The results of the reform include patchy delegation 
of clients and projects on one hand and the formalisation of the RAA/RABs in terms of both 
their external relationship and internal management on the other. 
 
It may seem ironic, but as RAAs increased their prominence and accordingly required an 
appropriate share of power and responsibility, then the diversity of their practice and 
flexibility had to be traded-off.  Also by diminishing local authorities representation, they had 
to run the risk of losing the key partner for regional and local policy development. 
 
At the heart of such an irony of growth is an issue of accountability.   Leat (1988) and Day 
and Klein (1987) in reference to the voluntary and to the public sector respectively, similarly 
argue that delegation of power and resources causes an issue of accountability.  That is, a 
hierarchy emerges where one is accountable and the other has the right to call in the other for 
the explanation and justification of specific action.  Accordingly clearly-stated objectives and 
common language to assess performance of the delegated party needs to be established.  In 
essence, accountability is a social and political process about perceptions and power (Day 
and Klein 1987, p2).  The argument made for the two sectors can equally be applied to 
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RAA/RABs, since they can be seen as a hybrid of voluntary and public organisations (see 
4.2.2 in Chapter 4). 
 
Thus, the very nature of accountability as explained above suggests that the specification of 
objectives and practical procedure to be complied by all the RABs was an integral part of the 
delegation of power.  While strengthened accountability, which in turn means centrally set-
out objectives, standards and performance indicators, may not have been a desired by-product 
of delegation on the part of the RAA/RABs, such a trend towards 
formalisation/standardisation/bureaucratisation was largely inevitable.  The RAAs were, 
whether conscious or not, in a dilemma to choose between being small, flexible, but marginal 
in the national picture and being large, bureaucratic, but having presence both regionally and 
nationally.  As Day and Klein (1987) argue in relation to National Health Service (NHS), 
delegation of responsibilities downward is necessarily  accompanied by accountability 
upward.  
 
However, to what extent the requirement of accountability impinges upon the autonomy of 
the party held accountable depends upon various factors.  First, the nature of service such as 
heterogeneity, complexity and uncertainty (Day and Klein 1987) would in practice 
complicate and possibly make a chain of accountability dysfunction.   Second, difficulty in 
developing techniques of measurement could leave some room for discretion at local level, 
because measurement of output and objectives are complex and multidimensional, 
particularly in public support of the arts.  Third, it will also depend upon the relative presence 
of the delegated for the delegating party.  As long as the former is marginal, accountability is 
not a real issue, which had been the case in the relationship between the Arts Council and the 
RAAs before the ‘Glory’.  Thus, it is a simplistic proposition that accountability immediately 
and directly damages autonomy.  The working relationship between the two is by far more 
complex.   
 
Nonetheless, the possibility of the trade-off between enlarged power and a decrease in local 
autonomy may be a principle worth bearing in mind.  For a further problem can be foreseen 
that the Arts Council would become more directive by setting more rules and standards in the 
name of ensured accountability, since the Council itself is increasingly under political 
scrutiny as well as in financial uncertainty. 
 
 
8.1.2  RAA/RABs and Local Authorities 
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The RAA/RABs have had another major party to account to, that is, local authorities.  
Accountability to local authorities has always been, however, the one that is less formal, 
official and structural than the one to the Arts Council in a sense that the RAA/RABs were 
not part of local government, and funding from local authorities constitute a minor income, 
thus creating no line of ‘political’ ‘managerial’ or ‘legal’ accountability.  This accountability 
involves no legal obligation of explanation such as audit or any tangible and immediate 
sanctions such as grant withdrawal. 
 
Nevertheless, accountability to local authorities has always been emphasised in RAA/RABs 
management, which was well exhibited in RAAs’ opposition to the recommendation of 
Wilding that local authorities’ representation be reduced.  There are at least two reasons why 
this horizontal accountability carries weight.  First, local authorities are the body that 
represent RAA/RABs’ origin and roots.  Transforming old forms in times of growth, 
although not a ‘bad’ thing in itself, would often cause strains and destabilise internal 
management.  Examples are abundant in voluntary and public sector organisations (Billis 
1993). 
 
Second, partnership with local authorities has become even more important in recent years as 
arts funding from government through the Arts Council becomes ever-tighter, which forces 
RAA/RABs to play a role more of ‘development agency’ than of ‘funding body’.  As was 
described in Chapter 5, opportunities for regional/local arts, which RAAs are concerned with, 
lie in non-arts funding sources in local authorities’ different departments and agencies.  
RAA/RABs need to work with various bodies of different jurisdictions.  As such, their 
relationship with local authorities is vital for successful policy development for the regions.  
While it is possible, in theory, for RAA/RABs to work with local authorities with their 
limited representation on management committees, a sense of fear that  reduced 
representation would lead to less sense of ownership and commitment was well-grounded. 
 
If the RABs were to retain the sense of accountability to local authorities to a substantial 
degree, despite the little managerial requirement involved in the relationship, then it could 
become a burden on top of its newly-strengthened accountability to the Arts Council.  As 
Smith (1981, p1173) succinctly points out, divided responsibility for decentralised 
organisations is not always matched by divided accountability.  Also it must be noted that 
there is potential for conflicts between horizontal and vertical accountability.  Although 
having the two lines has always been a matter of course for RAAs, the vertical one was 
relatively weak.  But now both are equally powerful.  This is in fact a problem typical of 
public organisations functioning locally (Smith and Stanyer 1976).  The problem is even 
compounded for regional intermediate organisations due to the lack of structural framework 
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for the general status of such bodies in the absence of regional government in England 
(Hogwood 1982, p8).  It seems that the RABs have managed to establish new relationships 
with the relevant bodies.  However, it is not without the alarming signs that indicate local 
authorities’ uneasy feelings about the new situation, and whether they will always be 
successfully sorted out will remain to be seen. 
 
8.1.3  Accountability to the Public 
 
So far in this chapter, I have argued over RAA/RABs’ accountability in relation to their 
direct stakeholders namely the Arts Council and local authorities.  RAA/RABs exist, 
however, to serve arts organisations and artists in principle and ultimately the general public.  
Compared to the public bodies’ presence on RAA/RABs management, however, both are 
their users, so to speak, and the general public in particular is less visible.  Hence 
accountability to both tends to become normative ideal rather than an immediate and realistic 
concern.  Accommodating the three accountabilities to different constituencies that delineate 
from different sources and carry out different significance to the organisations’ success is not 
an easy task for the RABs. 
 
Making Quangos, or appointed (as opposed to elected) boards, accountable to the public is an 
acute issue not only in the arts but in broader public policy in Britain (Burton and Duncan 
1996, p5).  In recent years as the Conservative government has attempted to replace local 
authorities with appointed bodies, locally operating organisations to deliver public services 
with appointed members on the board have enlarged their influence on the local scene.  
Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) and Training and Enterprise councils (TECs) are 
two of the largest executive bodies of this kind, playing major roles in urban regeneration and 
labour market policy respectively.  Stewart (1995) argues they are problematic for 
democracy, because unlike local authorities, they have few statutory obligations and 
mechanisms for accountability such as elections or a wide range of external scrutiny.   
 
So far there has been little criticism of this kind targeting the RABs, partly due to the 
peripheral position of culture in public policy discussions.  It may also be because the RABs 
have made efforts to be as accountable to the general public as possible.  There are devices 
for public accountability, as being practised at WMA, such as opening the Meetings of the 
Company to members of the general public and ensuring public access to information, which 
reflect the principles of public life set out in the 1995 Report of the Committee on Standards 
in Public Life (Cm 2850-I).  However, since this is a fundamentally structural problem rather 
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than a matter of code of practice and goodwill of individual bodies, it will need to be 
addressed in a thoroughgoing way. 
 
Having examined the situation of RABs in relation to the problem of accountability, it has 
become clear that the traditional form of ‘political accountability’, namely the notion that 
organisations with public duty should finally be answerable to Parliament through ministers, 
is after all an outdated myth in today’s highly complex service-delivery state, as some 
commentators have pointed out (eg Hirst 1995; Weir and Hall (eds) 1994; Day and Klein 
1987; Smith 1981; see also articles in Policy and Politics,24,1,1996; and Ridley and Wilson 
(eds) 1995). 
 
There is a growing need for rebuilding accountability, to which a number of interesting 
suggestions have been made, ranging from creation of regional government structure to 
which regional and local organisations should account to (Hirst 1995), separation of local 
matters from ministerial reporting to Parliament and creation of an institution for local 
accountability (Weir and Hall (eds)1994), strengthening of local government as an alternative 
line of accountability (Stewart 1992), involving user control and increasing opportunities for 
individual choice (Hirst 1995, Stewart 1992) to eliciting informed views of ordinary citizens 
(Stewart 1996).  Obviously this is an issue common to many areas of public policy and public 
administration in British politics, where cultural policy occupies one small part.  What this 
implies to us, however, is that cultural policy would be subject to the general change in the 
mechanism of public accountability, and we need to acknowledge that what has been done in 
the Glory strategy and the Wilding reform is rather changes in ‘managerialism’ within the 
given, traditional notion of public accountability without challenging this framework.   
 
Finally, it must also be noted that managerial reorganisation dominated the core of the 
political decentralisation and that the discussion on the values and objectives of cultural 
decentralisation, which political decentralisation was supposed to serve, was gradually left 
out.  This is an issue to be developed in the next chapter.  
 
 
8.2  Division of Labour 
 
Lack of clarity in the division of labour between the three actors has also been a source of 
problems for planning in cultural decentralisation.  The need to clarify the relationship has 
long been recognised, since as early as the mid-1960s:   
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“Who is to provide the subsidy?...where is the ‘mutual benefit’?...but we have direct 
obligations to our client, of which we cannot divest ourselves.  This is a fine field for the 
elaboration of case-law” (ACGB 1965, p17).   
 
However, until the RAAs became prominent during the 1970s, their role was largely confined 
to the funding of small-scale organisations and projects, particularly those to promote 
‘access’ in the regions, which supplemented the range of the activities the Arts Council was 
responsible for both nationally and locally.  As they grew, however, the boundary blurred, 
and the need to define it was acknowledged for the purpose of meaningful devolution 
(Working Party 1977, para 2.5).  This was, indeed, a cornerstone for the discussion of 
political decentralisation during the 1980s as declared in 1980 “the Group’s1 approach would 
establish a clear division of responsibilities between the regions and the centre” (Working 
Group 1980, p23). 
 
The division of labour has been generally conceptualised in two ways:  one in functional 
terms and the other in terms of the kinds of the arts for support.  The argument in the first 
respect defines the centre as responsible for creation of cultural activities, the regional for 
distribution, and the local for consumption (ie maintenance of venues and promoting 
participation) so that the three complement each other and square the circle.  Such a flowchart 
has been envisaged on the Continent, explicitly in the Netherlands (Council of Europe 1994a, 
section 6) and implicitly in Sweden and France (Council of Europe 1990a; Council of Europe 
1991) where cultural decentralisation was planned with relatively great involvement of the 
state.  In practice, however, all levels of government inevitably are engaged with every 
function, and the scheme does not work. 
 
In Britain, the lack of direct political lines between the three players makes it almost 
impossible to enforce the dividing of responsibilities.  To overcome such difficulty, practical 
discussions should have tackled with specification of the roles to be played by each party to 
the best possible extent.  As to local authorities, there used to be a general understanding that 
their contribution was primarily through venue buildings and maintenance for theatres or 
service to the community rather than to artistic professionals, in contrast to supporting the 
creativity of professional arts by the Arts Council and the RAAs (Working Group 1980, p13).  
During the 1980s, however, an increasing number of local authorities started to take a more 
active approach to the creation of the arts in a variety of ways, which sometimes were more 
diverse and dynamic than the arts funding bodies could possibly employ, through the 
deployment of various functions and resources of local authorities.  However, local 
1 This denotes the Working Group jointly set up for the purpose of reviewing the relationship between the Arts 
Council and the RABs. 
 52
authorities’ roles in comparison to the Arts Council and the RAA/RABs have been little 
conceptualised, taking such development into consideration.   
 
The demarcation of the roles between the Arts Council and the RAA/RABs is of course more 
problematic, since the principal objectives of all the parties involved have increasingly 
become identical as the latter grew (CoRAA 1983).  Surprisingly, an exercise to identify 
similarities and differences in a precise fashion has not been realised, despite the recognition 
that “a further limitation (of the present system) seemed to the Group to be the lack of any 
clear statement of general policies to which the RAAs and ACGB can equally relate” 
(Working Group 1980, p8).   
 
Often broad language was employed to stress the need for decentralisation.  In some cases 
simple tautology at best was found: “The Arts Council should decentralise..., concentrating 
itself directly on national issues and organisations” (House of Commons 1968, para 90), “The 
Arts Council should...devolve on RAAs on all decisions except those which can be shown, 
now and as time goes on, to require decision by a national body” (italics original, Lord 
Redcliffe-Maud 1976, pp37-38), “(RAAs’) main emphasis has been an identifying gaps in 
regional provision” (Working Group 1980, p9), “handover of routine responsibility for its 
clients, other than the national companies, to the regional arts associations and the local 
authorities” (House of Commons 1982, para 6.11).  What is exactly meant by ‘regional’ or 
‘national’, crucial to determining the division, remains unclear. 
 
Alternatively, functional difference can be attributed to the centre and the region in terms of 
funding vs non-financial support such as information service and help in increasing income 
from different sources (ie local authorities, commercial sponsors and the market).  The 1980 
report saw the Arts Council’s major approach had been that of reactive paymaster, whilst the 
RAAs’ was proactive and developmental (Working Group 1980, p9).  This may have been 
arguably the case at that time, however, the point is that again overlapping has occurred since 
then.  The Arts Council of the 1980s set up the Marketing Department in 1986 and 
administered the Incentive Funding Scheme to encourage efficient management of arts 
organisations from 1988 to 1991.  It also started to take an initiative in regional projects 
through Arts 2000, whereby a particular city is designed each year to be the capital of some 
art form.   
 
Conversely, financial growth of the RAAs, even without taking the ‘Glory’ effect into 
account, has enabled them to administer more awards and grants than before, and at the same 
time the prospect of financial stringency of recent years has made them develop the catalyst 
role of collaborating with various bodies in the region.  CoRAA even saw it necessary that 
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advice and grant-making go hand in hand for the dynamic development of culture in a wider 
societal context (CoRAA undated, p4).  If we take this view, then, it would be almost 
impossible to divide the line between the two, except by dividing the kinds of the arts to be 
supported by each, which leads us to the second reference point for the division of labour. 
 
Another way of dividing responsibilities between the parties is that in terms of criteria for 
subsidy.  The conventional dichotomy between the centre and the sub-central in this respect 
was the former holding the principle of excellence and innovation, whereas the latter being 
oriented towards the benefits of a larger community, which was by implication of secondary 
importance by artistic standards (eg Wilding 1989).  Accordingly the size of the organisation 
to be supported tended to be, if not always, larger at the centre.   
 
Fortunately, discussions were more rigorously made in this respect than the case relating to 
function to dispute the above view as simplistic.  To cite the decentralisation document of 
1980 again (Working Group 1980, p24):   
“it may well be that, say, a large drama company demonstrating consistently high artistic 
standards can best be assessed regionally, whereas a much smaller and less consistent 
company may require national assessment.” 
In response to the Wilding Report, where an old dichotomy still reappeared, though in this 
case between the regional and the local, CoRAA strongly argued (CoRAA 1990?, p10): 
“...excellence exists at all levels and scales of operation throughout the system, requiring 
expert support and encouragement, both nationally and regionally.” 
 
The above citations indeed made interesting points, called attention to the need for reworking 
the meaning of ‘excellence’ and highlighted the importance of less conventional, quality arts 
of various nature, ie non-building-based, non-European, participatory, developmental and 
experimental.  They deny any one art form or any one type of activity intrinsic merit and  
superiority to the others.  This relativistic approach would imply activities of all kinds in 
various contexts must be understood on a broad, single scale of excellence or merit at one end 
and mediocrity at the other.  Theatre workshop at prison can be artistically more excellent 
than a full-staged opera production at the Covent Garden.   
 
The drawback of inventing a single scale of evaluation without a highly sophisticated concept 
of ‘excellence’, however, is that it would lead to no logical division of labour between the 
relevant parities.  Or in a worse case it would allocate the centre responsible for the top end 
irrespective of geographic location of the activities concerned and the sub-central for the rest, 
and thus returning to the old stereotyped division. 
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Avoidance of such a danger may be one of the reasons why arguments on power transfer 
have gradually shifted to administrative minutiae to achieve coherence in the arts funding 
system, and this has resulted in an opaque, hence convenient but still problematic, conclusion 
that “all ‘regionally-based’ arts organisations should be decentralised which had at least one 
of the following aspects: 
1) A strong geographical base in one region,  
2) Significant local authority funding within a single region, 
3) A performance/exhibition/ or production base in one region, 
while truly ‘national’ organisations and issues should remain at the centre” (Luce 1990c; 
ACE 1990, p1).  Hence back to the repeated tautology. 
 
The diffusion made through the Wilding reform is self-definitive and unclear.  According to 
ACE’s view of drama expressed in the Consultative Document for Drama Review (ACE 
1995c), even after delegation of regional, producing theatres, it appears that the Arts Council 
feels it should fund all kinds of activities in drama, of all scales, of different nature, serving 
different functions and constituencies.  The Arts Council contends that the health of the 
theatre sector, which is diverse, is dependent upon the cross-fertilisation among different 
components:  National companies draw on ideas and talents developed in small-scale, 
independent groups.  Presenting theatres in the regions receive touring companies from all 
over the country.  Regional producing theatres are increasingly required to do collaborative 
production not only for cash saving but also, more importantly, for the exchange and 
sparkling of ideas and skills (ACE 1995c).  To maintain and promote such a ‘network’ 
(Drama Officer, ACE) or ‘drama ecology’ (ACE 1995c) is of national importance. 
 
By the same token, the RABs could equally claim for most of the clients to be delegated.  
Even the RSC, which had been exempted from delegation possibilities from the beginning as 
a national company, could have been delegated to WMA as a company based in Stratford, or 
to the London Arts Board, because its base in London receives ‘significant’ input from the 
Corporation of City. 
 
As we have seen, however, the shady principle easily lent itself to the politics among the Arts 

























Chapter 9:  Cultural Decentralisation : Problems in Planning 
 
It seems that cultural decentralisation in Britain has not been seriously planned and has 
remained fragmented in the cases of both local authorities and also with the regional bodies.  
The issues of attaining equality in cultural provision were substituted by the managerial 
reform within the arts funding system.  Chapter 8 has outlined the problems in political 
decentralisation.  This chapter will attempt to address some of the issues in cultural 
decentralisation, including the concept of equality and the implication of geography.  It will 
lastly make a brief mention of the new resources for the arts relevant to cultural 
decentralisation planning. 
 
9.1  Equality as a Goal 
 
As was pointed out in the earlier discussion (see 2.1 in Chapter 2), equality is the underlying 
value for, and should be the guiding principle of, decentralisation.  Although at first sight the 
notion looks quite simple, ‘equality’ (or improving ‘access’ as has been used in Britain) has 
rarely been made specified (ACGB 1993, p64).  What is exactly meant by “to increase the 
accessibility of the arts to the public” (Royal charter, ACE, in ACE 1995a, p1), and “people 
outside (of London) should get a fair share of the opportunities” (Channon, then Arts 
Minister, in House of Commons (1982), Q 127)?  It will be helpful to refer to Le Grand et al 
(1992) who interpret equality, or equity to be more precise in this context, in terms of full 
equality and minimum standards in social policy issues such as education and health.  To 
apply the two interpretations to cultural policy, firstly the attainment of full equality would 
mean everyone should receive equal provision of culture for equal needs.  Secondly, setting 
minimum standards would mean that nobody should fall below the minimum level, for 
example having at least one museum, one concert hall and a theatre within an hour travel, but 
there are other individuals who can reach more than the set of three facilities within twenty 
minutes. 
 
In cultural decentralisation, such distinction is crucial for policy development. If we employ 
the first interpretation, planning in cultural decentralisation should be concerned with the 
comparison of the number of arts organisations, facilities and performances per head across 
the regions.  The second interpretation would start by defining a basic ‘basket’ of cultural 
provision per head and examine if the minimum is satisfied in the localities.  Thus, the 
starting point and the direction of policy planning would be different.  As was suggested, 
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cultural policy seems to have evolved without developing the definition and measurement of 
the concept of equality. 
 
 
Furthermore, the attainment of ‘full equality’ is also complex in itself, and again there seems 
to be little agreement upon its definition and measurement.  Full equality can be interpreted 
as equality of access, equality of use and equality of outcome.1  Policy to attain each will take 
different forms, either by decreasing the resources for the advantaged, or increasing them for 
the disadvantaged.2   
 
When applied to our concern with cultural policy, equality of access can be reduced to a 
matter of cost.  For if people in one region have to travel relatively further than their 
counterparts in other region to reach arts events, it is more expensive in terms of actual travel 
expenses and the cost in time.  Then, ceteris paribus, equality of cost is not attained.   The 
diffusion policy of CEMA and the Arts Council in its early years is located here, whereby the 
provision of cultural facilities and the promotion of touring performance in many towns was 
the main measure.  Later on, the Arts Council changed the measure achieving this goal to a 
less expensive form of subsidised coach travel to bring people to venues.   
 
Equality of use relates to attendance rate.  Empirically, it is well known that attendance rate is 
largely determined by socio-economic class and educational qualifications (Bourdieu et al 
1969).  Therefore, if relevant people inhabiting different regions show different attendance 
rates, ceteris paribus, it is plausible to conclude cultural opportunities are not equally 
provided for equal needs.  Measures have to be taken to see participation by groups 
reasonably reflect the population. 
 
Equality of outcome has more qualitative aspects and it is difficult to measure, as it is related 
to the quality of cultural provision and the quality of one’s life regardless of regional 
location.  To attain this, policy should aim at providing a wide variety of cultural 
opportunities: different arts disciplines, both traditional and avant-garde, small-scale and 
large-one, participatory as well as passive, European and non-European, and so on.  It also 
has to aim for equal enrichment of people’s lives through cultural provision, be it as leisure 
1 These alternative interpretations are developed based on Le Grand (1982, pp72-72), where he lists equality of 
public expenditure, equality of cost (rather than access), equality of use, and equality of outcome.  For my 
analysis, the first one was omitted, for it is a policy input and different from the others in nature (see Chapter 1).  
In order to adapt his account on social areas such as education and health to culture, I substitute ‘cost’ with 
‘access’. 
2 Rae (1981, pp110-112) points out four criteria of relative equality, which can be translated into four strategies to 
improve equality.  These are, to improve the position of the less advantaged, to increase the ratio between the 
lesser entitlement and the greater, to decrease the absolute difference between the greater entitlement and the 
lesser, and to diminish the entitlement of the more advantaged. 
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time, intellectual challenge or self-enlightenment. Equality of outcome seems to be one of the 
most important principles in Swedish cultural policy albeit with some ambiguity and is 
manifested in its commitment to decentralisation (Council of Europe 1990a, p72).  In the 
British context, however, this would be felt too costly in general and patronising to breach 
the principle of laissez-faire.   
 
In Britain, equality or accessibility relating to cultural decentralisation has only vaguely been 
argued with the little conceptualisation outlined above.  No wonder that the different 
meanings of decentralisation are confused and mistakenly used in interchangeable ways, as 
was pointed out in Chapter 1.  In order to plan effective policy for decentralisation, therefore, 
it seems imperative to try to specify the concepts regarding equality as discussed above as 
clearly as possible and to undertake research that is relevant. 
 
9.2  Geography for Cultural Decentralisation  
 
9.2.1  Producing Theatres and Audience 
 
On top of the problems of principle regarding cultural decentralisation as were examined 
above, cultural decentralisation faces practical difficulties as well.  To begin with, one could 
question whether planning of cultural decentralisation is possible at all.  Arts organisations 
and activities have grown spontaneously from inside, and the current structure is largely 
historical.  Even when government intervention for the purpose of dispersal of arts activities 
could be legitimatised, it is questionable if that would help to flourish the arts.  This poses a 
problem, particularly in England, where cultural policy has been operationalised mainly in 
the form of enabling as opposed to direct provision.   
 
Some of the regional theatres we have today have been deliberately located in relatively large 
cities with the aid of the Arts Council or local authorities’ co-operation.  The Birmingham 
Repertory and the Belgrade are the prime examples.  The Swan grew out of an amateur 
society in Worcester.  The New Victoria was initially a touring company and took 
opportunities in the mid 1960s that enabled the company to settle in its current place as a 
producing, building-based theatre. 
 
Since then, however, demography and geography issues have changed for the theatres in the 
regions, as people have become mobile and do not mind motoring twenty miles to choose 
particular productions, rather than staying loyal to specific theatres, which brings 
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heterogeneity to theatres while regular audience group if any is ageing and shrinking (WMA 
1995, p2, p4; ACE 1995c, p10).   
 
Under these circumstances, ACE and WMA similarly see it necessary for producing theatres 
to redefine themselves, suggesting that they become more specialised and build up specific 
audiences, possibly by reducing the number of their own productions, while enhancing 
diversity of programming presented at their own venues by inviting productions made 
elsewhere on different strengths (ACE 1995c, WMA 1995). 
 
Such a vision is applied to the case of the Swan in Worcester as the problem of smaller-scale 
regional, producing theatres pointed out by the ACE (1995c): 
“(The diversity of art for the audience) is unlikely to be met...by a succession of 
inadequately resourced home productions;  their directors should positively embrace the 
range of work available from touring companies and through collaborations with other 
companies” (p16). 
 
In other words, policy-makers at both levels seem to agree that the dispersal of the theatres of 
similar kinds within reasonable reach is not always necessary nor desirable (ACE 1995c, 
WMA 1995).  Therefore, as far as theatre is concerned, it may well be that ‘accessibility’ has 
taken on a contemporary element, but we are not yet told of the change in explicit terms. 
 
9.2.2  Is Concentration Necessary? 
 
Another issue is a question of whether concentration is a necessity for the arts.  In many 
countries, whenever government tries to relocate arts organisations and artists from the 
capital to other cities across the country, it has met with strong opposition on the part of the 
arts in most cases, even with a promise of improved finance (eg Council of Europe 1990b, 
p95, see also Appendix 2 of BBC/Arts Council (1994), which outlines a history of the failure 
of the Arts Council to diffuse orchestral provision in Britain).   
 
The main reason for anti-decentralisation is that the artists feel it necessary to have critical, 
responsive audiences, which is more likely to appear from the heterogeneous mass in large 
cities.  In Britain, critical review in quality newspapers are mostly nationally produced in 
London, and critics live in London.  Therefore it is important for the arts to get exposed in 
London for career and prestige development.  Most importantly, actual proximity to artistic 
activities of competitors and a pool of talent are more easily available in the centre.  Although 
it may be competitive, more sponsorship opportunities seem to exist in London (ABSA 
 61
1995).  All of these factors cumulate to a further concentration of the arts in large cities and 
the capital in particular.   
 
The regional theatres surveyed were those which prefer regions and maintain that network, 
but their opposition to delegation derived from the fear of losing contact with the competition 
that was going on at the centre.  In fact, most directors said that they regularly go to London 
to do auditions and for the exchange of information. 
 
Likewise, in the region of West Midlands, Birmingham is the centre, and organisations in the 
city tend to benefit from resources which are not available in smaller cities and rural areas in 
the region, causing a feeling of unfairness for the latter.  However, not much is known as to 
the difference in the actual needs by areas.  If simply asked whether they want arts provision 
nearby, most would be positive, but that should not always indicate their ‘needs’—sometimes 
potential and latent—as opposed to ‘wants’.  This is an issue that will involve philosophical 
arguments. 
 
9.3  New Sources of Money 
 
Planning of cultural decentralisation is becoming difficult particularly in recent years, 
because of the National Lottery fund flowing into culture and the arts.   There is not much 
research to investigate their impact on cultural decentralisation yet.  Anecdotes and 
impressionistic observations made so far tell that the RABs are increasing their presence in 
the regions as they possess specialist knowledge and expertise needed by cultural planning 
with the new sources of money.  On the other hand, the new possibility of opening a cultural 
facility just across the road to the existing one would change the whole cultural map and 












Chapter 10:  The Relationship between Political and Cultural 
Decentralisation  
 
Having seen the problems associated with political as well as cultural decentralisation, this 
chapter will be concerned with the relationship between the two.  As was repeated, the 
argument is prevalent that cultural decentralisation must go hand in hand with political 
decentralisation.  This may seem convincing, when we view small governance at sub-national 
level favourably as a responsive, flexible institution.  However, once we start to analyse the 
concept of equity in culture even more specifically than has been done in Chapter 8, a 
different picture emerges. 
 
Heald (1983) distinguishes territorial equity (lumping residents in particular jurisdictions 
together) from interpersonal one (seeing individual citizens as distinct from each other), and 
argues that the three values of territorial equity, interpersonal equity and local autonomy are 
not compatible with each other.  Applied to cultural policy case, his argument would go like 
this:  When the actual outcome of territorial equality is to be ensured, interpersonal equity is 
also guaranteed.  That is, when standards of cultural provision are exactly the same across the 
regions, equity between relevant individuals is also guaranteed.  An extremely centralist 
structure of policy administration is the most effective way of achieving it, where “the 
desired level of service is specified centrally and pursued uniformly” (Heald 1983, p241).  In 
other words, equality, which is the ultimate value of cultural decentralisation, is not 
compatible with local autonomy, which is likewise the ultimate value of political 
decentralisation:  We are faced with a big paradox. 
 
Heald continues:  If we employ less stringent version of territorial equity, that is, potential 
outcome of territorial equity, then each jurisdiction will receive equitable resources (eg 5p 
per head of the population plus special grants for areas with low resources and high needs) 
and thereby have the same opportunity set but can choose to achieve different outcomes, 
reflecting local preference.  Area X may prefer to support arts in primary schools at the 
expense of grant-making to experimental projects, or area Y may concentrate on theatre and 
ignore music altogether in response to consumers’ or producers’ needs in the area.  In this 
case, therefore, territorial equity is guaranteed although areas X and Y choose to have 
different outcomes, and local autonomy is respected.  Also, interpersonal equity within each 
area can be achieved, because choice within areas is collective.  However, interpersonal 
equity between residents in areas X and Y is inevitably sacrificed.  In other words, if political 
decentralisation is enhanced, and local autonomy is increasingly respected, then, it must be 
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tolerated that a person in area X and his/her counterpart in area Y do not have equal 
opportunities. 
 
This is not a new problem nor a new discovery of an old problem, as indeed Gournay, a 
French political scientist, briefly mentioned in describing decentralisation in French cultural 
policy (Council of Europe 1991, p294).  It is simply that “few individuals seem to have fully 
defined preferences over the three values” (Heald 1983, p243).  It appears that potential 
conflicts and the possibility of trade-off between the three have been largely ignored in policy 
discourse of cultural and political decentralisation.   
 
It would be fair to say cultural decentralisation has been an ideal in policy, but never 
conceived as a specific and achievable policy goal.  Similarly, political decentralisation has 
rarely been understood as a realistic means for the objective of cultural decentralisation 
which has remained unspecified.  Rather it has been picked up in an ad hoc fashion for other 
objectives.  Whether the structural dilemma of decentralisation explained above can still be 
ignored or not depends upon several factors.  They include the availability of resources, 
which has a bleak future, the capabilities of the RABs to be exhibited by themselves, and the 
changing environments in which the arts operate, determined by the needs and the taste of the 



















Conclusion :  Summary and Future Issues 
 
This paper has attempted to investigate the theoretical and practical issues and problems of 
decentralisation in cultural policy through examining the British experience in particular.  
This chapter will summarise the major findings of the foregoing parts and conclude the report 
by discussing some of the limitations this study has had and suggesting two areas for further 
study:  inter-organisational relationships among organisations in the cultural field in the 
region and principles in cultural policy. 
 
The key findings of the three parts are summarised as follows. 
 
PART 1: THEORIES ON DECENTRALISATION   
Part 1 has sketched out the theoretical complexities of the concept of decentralisation to 
provide an analytical framework for the following discussions.  It has identified different 
meanings of the term (Table 1.1 in Appendix B), values attached to decentralisation and a 
variety of strategies for spatial diffusion of cultural activities (Table 2.1 and 2.2 in Appendix 
B).   
 
♦ I have argued that although decentralisation has been regarded as one of the main goals 
for cultural policy in many countries, the conceptual multiplicity of the term and the 
values of decentralisation have remained under-theorised. 
• Decentralisation has at least three aspects; cultural, fiscal and political (Table 1.1 in 
Appendix B). 
• Cultural decentralisation is a policy objective, concerned with inequality in cultural 
opportunities among people, which can be due to geographical, socio-economic and 
cultural divisions of the population.   
• Fiscal decentralisation is about disparity of public expenditure.  Disparity can be 
found among: 
1. different geographical localities public expenditure is made for (eg per capita 
spending in the capital vs in the regions),  
2. different public authorities in charge of funding (eg spending by central 
government vs local government), and  
3. different groups of cultural producers subsidy is provided for (eg subsidy for 
European- vs non-European-origin arts). 
• Political decentralisation is about the diffusion of political and administrative power 
for decision-making and implementation in cultural policy.  This is conceptualised as 
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a means for achieving cultural decentralisation, but can be a policy objective in its 
own right. 
♦ In practice, these distinct meanings are often confused.  A major problem is that fiscal 
decentralisation, which is a concern with ‘input’, has colonised the discussion on cultural 
decentralisation which is a policy objective.  In order to focus on policy objectives rather 
than inputs, the scope of this paper has been limited to cultural decentralisation in relation 
to geographical diffusion of cultural provision and to political decentralisation, ie the 
power relationships between public bodies involved in cultural policy. 
♦ The values of decentralisation have remained ambiguous, too.  There is a need to theorise 
the issue of fair distribution of publicly-financed cultural goods and services. 
 
PART 2: DECENTRALISATION IN BRITISH CULTURAL POLICY 
Part 2 has described the historical development of cultural and political decentralisation in 
Britain.  RAA/RABs and local authorities have served as focal points for the examination, 
since the empowerment of RAA/RABs and the encouragement of local authorities have been 
identified as possible strategies for implementing decentralisation.  Both sets of organisations 
have gone through significant changes in their relationships with their central counterparts.  
Five building-based, producing, repertory theatres in the West Midlands have been focused 
upon.  The case study has been to assess the impact of the changes in the arts funding system 
and in central-local government politics on the arts. 
 
♦ In Britain, centralism has historically been strong both culturally and politically.  
Nonetheless, regional arts associations (later boards) and local authorities have become 
increasingly important players in cultural policy.  Decentralisation can be implemented 
through the empowerment and encouragement of these organisations. 
• There have been two major attempts to transfer power from the Arts Council to the 
RAA/RABs (Table 5.1 in Appendix B).  Neither, however, has been successful in 
achieving the initial objective of cultural decentralisation. 
1. The first one in the mid-1980s (the Glory of the Garden strategy) was a one-
off devolution of clients, but not much thought was given to the division of 
responsibilities between the centre and the regions. 
2. The second one in the early 1990s (the Wilding Review reform) has led to a 
centralised structure of the arts funding system.  The reform has ended up 
with various changes in administrative practice, and the ‘contracting-out’ of 
clients and projects from the Arts Council to the RABs.  But it is obvious 
that the reform has not functioned to nurture regionalism. 
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• Local authorities are neither directly located in the arts funding system which is the 
‘Quango’ sector in Britain, nor held legally obliged to the provision of cultural 
services.  Nevertheless, they have become major contributors to the arts over the 
decades. 
• Since 1979, local government has been transformed through various measures and 
legislation in British politics.  While their role in mainstream services has been 
increasingly undermined, local authorities have developed scope in the area of urban 
regeneration, to which it has been recognised that culture can make a contribution. 
• It is difficult to assess the extent to which arts provision has suffered from the 
changing relationship between central and local government for arts provision is a 
marginal area in government, but in general arts budgets have been squeezed.       
• The theatre sector was against delegation, but four of the surveyed were handed over 
to the RABs.  The theatres in principle are critical about the current pattern of arts 
funding, where regionalism has not taken root and bureaucracy has increased.  But 
they acknowledge some advantages of being regionally-funded, such as the RAB’s 
ability to negotiate with local authorities on funding matters. 
• The financial difficulty of the local authorities has generally hit the theatres.  Under 
such circumstances, it seems that an economy of scale is in operation:  Larger 
theatres, particularly those located in the cities keen on their image-building and 
marketing for economic regeneration, would stand relatively better chances.  Small-
scale producing theatres need funders’ special commitment. 
 
PART 3:  DISCUSSION 
Part 3 has singled out the issues that have emerged from the empirical findings in Part 2, and 
tried to explain why political as well as cultural decentralisation has failed to be realised in 
British cultural policy.   
 
♦ As to political decentralisation, two major issues have been focused upon, ie 
accountability and division of labour. 
• As RAAs increased their prominence and required a fair share of power and 
responsibility in cultural policy, diversity and flexibility which had been the main 
feature of the regional bodies had to be traded-off.  The concept of accountability has 
been the key to understanding such a process.  Delegation of tasks by definition 
requires specification of policy and practice between the two parties.  Formalisation 
of the party the task is delegated to is also an integral part of the process.  
• RABs’ relationship with local authorities is being challenged, as their accountability 
to the locally elected bodies involves few tangible obligations and requirements but 
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depends upon communal identity and a sense of partnership.  If the RABs wish to 
remain accountable to the Arts Council and local authorities equally, there is a 
potential for conflict. 
• Making RABs accountable to the general public is another issue in and beyond 
cultural policy per se. 
• Another source of problem for political decentralisation has been the lack of clarity 
in the division of labour among the Arts Council, RAA/RABs and local authorities.  I 
have argued that the division has been conceived in two ways, neither of which has 
been practically useful.  They are: 
1. division in functional terms (ie support for production, distribution and 
consumption, or alternatively funding vs non-funding services).  There has 
been, however, overlapping between the Arts Council and the RAA/RABs, 
hence this does not work. 
2. division in terms of the kinds of arts supported (ie arts of ‘excellence’ and 
the rest).  The possibility of multiple interpretations of ‘excellence’ has made 
this dysfunctional. 
• As a result, the divisions of the roles in cultural policy between different authorities 
have not been well-defined.  Delegation was based on a self-definitive distinction (ie 
‘regionally-based’ organisations to be funded by RABs). 
♦ As to cultural decentralisation, the key to its success is to define the concept of equality. 
• Equality can be formulated in terms of full equality attainment and a guarantee of 
minimum standards.  Each would require a different objective and direction for 
policy planning. 
• If ‘full equality’ is chosen, it is necessary to elaborate its meaning further.  The 
interpretation of the term includes equality of access (or cost), equality of use and 
equality of outcome.  Ambiguity of the term or the lack of understanding of such 
distinctions has been one of the main reasons for the failure of cultural 
decentralisation. 
♦ Other issues highlighted include the changing significance of geography and demography 
for cultural institutions, which require each theatre to have distinctive features from 
others. 
♦ The relationship between political and cultural decentralisation has been found to be 
contradictory to dispute a prevalent view that the two types of decentralisation go hand in 
hand.  The concepts of territorial equity (equity between different areas, in which 
residents are conceptualised as ‘groups’ of people) and interpersonal equity (equity 
between individuals-as distinct citizens from each other) illuminates the existence of a 
paradox: 
 69
• When standards of cultural provision are to be exactly the same across jurisdictions, 
which ensures territorial and interpersonal equities, the most effective way of 
achieving this is an extremely centralist structure at the expense of local autonomy 
and regional diversity. 
• In contrast, when political decentralisation progresses and local autonomy is 
respected, interpersonal inequality across territorial borders will increase:  People in 
area A and B will have different opportunities in culture. 
I have argued that such a problem has largely been ignored. 
 
To sum up, the paper has shown that decentralisation in cultural policy, despite its apparent 
significance on policy agendas, has not benefited from theorisation in terms of its meaning 
and measurement and  in relation to the concept of equality.  It seems policy-makers have 
ignored, or been unaware of, the potential conflicts in the values of accountability vs 
diversity, interpersonal equality vs local autonomy.  These are important to note because each 
value and principle would need different strategies for its achievement.  I have concluded the 
last chapter by putting forward my view that cultural decentralisation itself has been an ideal 
in policy but never received serious attention with which to clarify and prioritise conflicting 
values and objectives.  As such, effective planning for equality in culture has not been 
possible. 
 
As is often the case with research, however, the issues tackled in the paper have raised more 
questions to ask than provided answers.  The remaining part of this paper will discuss them in 
relation to the limitations of this study and suggest some of the themes which deserve further 
research and on-going debate.  They will be divided into two broad areas for the purpose of 
discussion:  firstly, the regional picture of culture and the arts in Britain and secondly the lack 
of clearly understood principles in cultural policy in Britain and perhaps beyond.  Both will 




Arts Organisations in the Region 
 
The case study has been only a small-scale one on a particular set of arts organisations in the 
West Midlands at a specific point in time.  Possibly different cultural sectors have different 
experiences, and it would be interesting to investigate further the impacts of the changes in 
RABs and local authorities outlined in this paper on the arts of different kinds in the region 
more widely.  For example, research on arts centres which are only partially delegated might 
tell a different story.  Beck (1989), in examining the Wilding Review, suggested the likely 
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consequences of Wilding’s  recommendations.  He predicted, on the basis of the Review, that 
the winners in the new system would be building-based performing arts companies—national 
and regional—and the losers less established companies, projects with non-arts elements and 
finally the members of the community who had not been acculturated into the current 
audience of the established arts.  We know that many more alterations have been added to the 
original review in the implementation process for the reform of the arts funding system 
(Table 5.1).  It may be worth re-visiting Beck’s view to identify the winners and losers across 
the regions and sectors.  This would require larger-scale case studies of different sectors in 
the cultural field. 
 
Even with the examined theatres, there are more questions to ask.  I have briefly noted a 
theatre director’s comment on a developing way of ‘regional’ thinking at the arts 
organisations surveyed and another remark that resented the loss of the ‘national voice’ of the 
theatre sector.  These comments suggest an interesting area to explore from a sociological 
viewpoint.   
 
Prior to delegation, the whole drama sector used to have sub-sectors which were composed of 
similar companies in terms of size and artistic function (producing, presenting, touring, 
experimental, etc) across regions.  Delegation shuffled them, and all regional theatres, 
regardless of the ‘leagues’ they were identified with, have been effectively re-grouped by 
their geographical location into ten.  As far as funding arrangements are concerned, therefore, 
there no longer exists a sector of regional theatres as such across the country.  Instead we 
roughly have groups of theatres associated with their RABs on one hand, and ‘national’ 
companies and many non-building-based drama companies of all scales on the other hand.   
 
It is possible to speculate that as a result a theatre is generally enhancing communication with 
relevant organisations (ie theatre companies, funders, suppliers of artistic and administrative 
skills, etc) based in the same region, while its previous contact with its ‘constituencies’ and 
colleagues around the country may be becoming less frequent.  Such a change can lead to a 
new regional network, structure and identity.  This may seem to be a relatively minor point 
and have little immediate influence on artistic outputs, but it can imply a significant symptom 
of a latent, slow change under the surface, as will be explained below. 
 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983), sociologists on organisational theory with an institutional 
approach, discuss the phenomenon of ‘institutional isomorphism’.  According to them, the 
increase in the level of interaction between organisations—through resource dependency and 
information exchange—promotes similarities among themselves in terms of formal structure, 
internal culture and output.  This happens in the development of an “organizational field”, or 
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a group of “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a recognized area of 
institutional life” (p148).  Through sharing environmental constraints and opportunities, 
resources and the competitive market, which all organisations must respond to, they 
gradually become homogeneous in many respects.  Such a process towards ‘institutional 
isomorphism’ is concurrent with an emergence of domination and coalition patterns within 
the field.   
 
This study has not explored such an institutional aspect of arts organisations in the region.  
Certainly more research is needed to probe my speculation that the regional arts scene may be 
defining itself more distinctively than before, where arts and arts-related service 
organisations may be changing in relation to their structure, culture and output.  It may still 
be a little too early to conduct empirical research to test the theory provided by DiMaggio 
and Powell in our particular setting.  Also it must be noted that the aforementioned theory is 
exemplified in much larger contexts such as the development of the Federal Government’s 
support for the arts in the United States through the 1960s and 1970s.  An English region 
may be too small a field to test the theory.  Nevertheless, DiMaggio’s (1983) key contention 
that public policy implementation inadvertently affects inter-organisational relationships 
within the field—and this is even more significant for relevant individual organisations than 
the direct influence of policy implementation on them—seems to have a convincing power.  
As Hall and Quinn (1983) assert, more research needs to be generated which combines public 
policy analysis with organisational theory. 
 
Principles in Cultural Policy 
 
The second strand of issues is related to principles in cultural policy.  This paper has argued 
that cultural policy, not only in Britain but also in other European nations, has lacked a 
clearly identified meaning of the term ‘decentralisation’.  It has also been pointed out that 
cultural policy-makers have long evaded thoroughgoing discussion of geographical equality 
in culture as a guiding principle for decentralisation.  A debate on this subject would be of 
relevance in a larger context of public finance, where increasing fiscal problems, their spatial 
variety and the political fragmentation of western society pose challenges to the geographical 
concern of public finance (Bennett 1980). 
      
The above suggestion would entail, however, more fundamental discussions.  For we would 
need to re-visit the question of the rationale for public financing of culture and scrutinise the 
current distribution pattern of public funding.  The classic, perennial question should be 
reiterated:  Should cultural policy be concerned with the general public, or should it be more 
oriented to the promotion of artistic excellence and innovation?  If the latter is the stronger 
 72
case, concentration of the arts in the capital and the fact subsidies derive from tax do not, 
after all, matter very much.  If, to follow this case, public funding is legitimatised for its 
contribution to national prestige at present and in the future, which is one of the many 
economic theories on the subject, there is no need to be concerned that the tax burden is not 
always evenly shared by those who are benefiting.   
 
Besides, the lack of fiscal coincidence in the tax burden and public expenditure and the issue 
of unfair distribution do exist in many areas of our public life.  Social security is a good 
example of the separation of cost and benefit, although they are, in principle, implicitly based 
on a consensus that everybody must be socially insured against contingencies, and on an 
assumption of inter-generational solidarity in the case of pensions.  Higher education may be 
more controversial than social security, since university graduates are likely to earn more in 
the labour market than those without degree.  An idea of ‘graduation tax’ which in short is to 
make degree-holders subject to a higher rate of tax is arguably considered to be a means for 
redressing the balance.   
 
What is particularly problematic with cultural policy, however, is simply that debate on this 
subject has been either more or less ill-informed one or explicit advocacy.  It is not yet crystal 
clear whether cultural policy should go beyond the scope of the current audience to benefit 
the wider society which reflects the interests of taxpayers.  It is not explicit either whether 
cultural policy should be targeted more to the members of the society than to cultural 
producers.  One might even suspect the obscurity has been to help protect vested interests of 
the cultural institutions established in the current arts funding system.  We will need to, 
therefore, keep addressing these long-lasting questions. 
 
This study has analysed issues in cultural decentralisation through focusing on the value of 
equality.  However, it must be noted here that the values for distributional policy are not 
limited to equity (ie equal distribution) but are more wide-ranging, which call for 
philosophical arguments on justice.  We are not yet sure on what grounds cultural 
opportunities should be provided with public money.  It has not been clear whether ‘culture 
for all’ is a mere slogan or an expression of, albeit patronising, a concrete obligation of the 
state to its citizens.  If it is assumed to be an obligation, it is necessary to refine the notion so 
as to distinguish it from general civil rights, by asking on what conditions a citizen should be 
entitled to cultural provision.  It would be helpful to refer to Miller (1976) who identifies 
three criteria for applying the idea of justice to the evaluation of social benefits distribution:  
rights, deserts and needs.    
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These ideas regrettably have to remain as food for thought for the moment, for expanding 
these concepts in cultural policy would certainly require another paper.  Each will be difficult 
to specify, so will be the question of which one should permeate individual policies.  What 
should be registered here is the need to find criteria for evaluating the state of affairs which 
policy tries to address.  This would involve a great deal of political choice.  In many areas of 
public policy, political arguments ultimately call for voting in today’s democracy (Weale 
1983).  For good or bad, cultural policy has never been a major issue on political agendas at 
least in the UK, a tendency enhanced by the ‘arm’s length’ principle.  For this very reason, 
however, we cannot even envisage the way in which hard decisions could be made. 
 
On the whole, this paper may have been deconstructionist and presented fundamental 
questions for cultural policy rather than constructive, immediate recommendations.  For the 
cultural sector in the UK, a most pressing issue may be lack of financial resources among 
other things.  However, at a macro level, the limited availability of resources all the more 
demands an articulate principle for the distributive aspect of policy and the definition of 
equality which is at its core.  I would argue, furthermore, that it is critical to give our thought 
to and encourage research into the even broader issues raised in these concluding pages for 












Appendix A :  Schedule of Interviews 
 
1.  Theatre Directors 
 
Individuals Interviewed: 
General Manager, the Belgrade Theatre 
Executive Producer, the Birmingham Repertory Theatre 
Theatre Director, the New Victoria Theatre 
Artistic Director, the Worcester Swan Theatre 
General Manager, the Royal Shakespeare Company 
 
Questions Asked: 
• How would you describe your relationship with the local authorities, which fund your 
organisation, in the last 10-15 years? 
• Did the change of funding authority (from the Arts Council to the West Midlands Arts) 
affect your management (though it might be too early to evaluate it)? 
• What are challenges and opportunities for your organisation, in relation to changing 
climate of public funding? 
 
2.  Local Authorities 
 
Individuals Interviewed: 
Arts Development Officer, Coventry City Council 
Head of Arts and Entertainment, Birmingham City Council 
County Arts Officer, Staffordshire County Council 
Cultural Development Officer, Stoke-on-Trent City Council 
Arts Development Officer, Worcester City Council 
Museum, Arts and Heritage Officer, Worcester City Council 




• How would you describe your Council’s investment in relation to the general climate of 
economy and politics in the last 10-15 years?  Have you had any difficulty in getting 
culture as a priority area for the city (or county)? 
• It is often argued that central government in the last 10-15 years has tried to limit local 
government.  In what way has this trend affected your work? 
• In what way do you work with the West Midlands Arts? 
• How would you evaluate the devolution of funding responsibility for some regional arts 
organisations from the Arts Council to the West Midlands Arts? 
• What are challenges and opportunities for the arts in the region, in your view, in relation 




3.  Other Relevant Officers from Arts Funding Bodies 
 
Executive Officer, English Regional Arts Boards 
 
Questions Asked: 
• How would you describe the relationship between the Arts Council and the RAA/RABs? 
• It is often argued that central government in the last 10-15 years has tried to limit local 
government.  In what way has this trend affected your work? 
• How would you evaluate the devolution of funding responsibility for some arts 
organisations from the Arts Council to the Regional Arts Boards? 
• What are challenges and opportunities for the arts in the region, in your view, in relation 
to public funding? 
 
Regional Director, Arts Council of England 
Questions Asked: 
• How do you work with regional and local partners? 
• How would you describe the relationship between the Arts Council and Regional Arts 
Boards?  In what way has it been changed over recent years since the Wilding Review? 
• To what extent has the change of funding authority (from the Arts Council to the West 
Midlands Arts) affected recipient organisations (though it might be too early to evaluate 
it)? 
 
Chief Executive, West Midlands Arts  
Questions Asked: 
• What are the consequences of the delegation of the funding responsibilities for the 
theatres (the Birmingham Repertory, the Belgrade, the Swan, and the New Victoria) from 
the Arts Council? 
• Were you for or against the delegation? 
• What experiences have you had since the Wilding Review in relation to your clients and 
to the local authorities in the West Midlands region? 
• What kind of relationships are you trying to build up with the Arts Council and the local 
authorities which fund the theatres in the region? 
 
Drama Officer, Arts Council of England 
Questions Asked: 
• How would you describe delegation of regional theatres from the Arts Council to the 
Regional Arts Boards? 
• Would you think that the change of funding authority (from the Arts Council to the West 
Midlands Arts) affect their management (though it might be too early to evaluate it)? 
• Why is it that regional theatres are delegated while orchestras are not?  Does the 
difference  originate from departmental or corporate strategy? 







Drama Officer, West Midlands Arts 
Questions Asked: 
• What are the consequences of the delegation on your work of funding responsibilities for 
the theatres (the Birmingham Repertory, the Belgrade, the Swan, and the New Victoria) 
from the Arts Council? 
• Were you for or against the delegation? 
• What experiences have you had since the Wilding Review in relation to your clients and 
to local authorities? 
• What kind of relationships do you have with the Arts Council and the local authorities in 
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Table 2.1:  Cultural Decentralisation without Political Decentralisation  
 
 
 Centre Local 
 
Strategies • Deconcentration 
• Establishment of Cultural 




• Voluntary Development 
• Persuasion 
Examples • Regional Offices 
• Maison de la culture (France) 
• Touring 
• RAAs 







Table 2. 2 :  Cultural Decentralisation with Political Decentralisation 
 
 
 With transfer of power 
= zero-sum game 
Without transfer of power 
= no loser 
 
Strategies • Transfer of Resources (authority, 
money, legitimacy, information 
and organisation) 
 
• Statutory Measures to Empower 
and Encouragement the local in 
cultural policy 
Examples • Devolution-The Glory Strategy 
• Delegation-The Wilding Review 
 


























Renton (19 Dec,1990) 
No. of 
RABs 
6-9, 7 preferred 10    
No. of 
Members 
Maximum 24 Maximum 24 12 an optimum size of 
15, should not be 
larger than 18 
12-18, (24 with 







1/3 of the member should not be 
the majority 
1/3   maximum 1/3 maximum 1/3 
reserved, a regional 
consultative forum 




1/3 LAs co-option 
1/3 by ACGB 




 • LAs directly
appoint their 
representative ii , in 
consultation 
























 • OAL, BFI, Crafts 
consulted and can 
veto 
• regional selection 
committee to 
recommend for 
approval by ACGB 
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ACGB 
• OAL iv , BFI, 
Crafts consulted 




• elected by 
Board members 
• comment by the 
Minister before 
the election 










with the board 
 
 




 • ACGB consult BFI, 
Crafs Council 




• consent of the 
Minister 
• consent of the 
Minister 
• selection 














• a name presented 
for approval to 
ACGB 









Wilding 1989 Luce 1990b Mellor 1990 Review Team 1990 Renton 1990 
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Table 5.2 :  Chronology of Devolution-Delegation 
 
 
Year Publication (in italics)/Event Detail 
 
1956/6 South West Arts established The first RAA 
1961 North West Arts established First RAA with LA representatives 
1968 Estimates Committee, House of 
Commons 
Need for decentralisation mentioned 
1965 A Policy for the Arts: the first steps Jennie Lee, White Paper 
 
1973 South East Arts established All regions covered by RAA 
1976 Support for the Arts in England and 
Wales 
By Lord Redcliffe-Maud 
 
1977 Towards Decentralisation: a working 
party report on relations between the 
AC and RAAs 
Consultation document, as part of a 
greater commitment to devolution. 
 
1979 AC&RAAs Joint Working Group set 




1980 Towards a New Relationship Informal ACGB/RAA Working Group 
 
1982 Public and Private Funding of the Arts Eighth Report from the Education Science 
and Arts Committee, Session 1981-82. 
 
1982 A Hard Fact to Swallow: the division 
of Arts Council expenditure between 
London and the English regions 
Report by PSI 
 
 
1984 Public and Private Funding for the 
Arts, Observations by the Government 
On the Eighth Report from the Education 
Science and Arts Committee, Session 
1981-82. HMSO 
 
1984 The Glory of the Garden ACGB, devolution 
 
1986 Abolition of Metropolitan Authorities  
 
 
1987 ACGB starts to to produce 3 year 
Corporate Plan to OAL 
 
1987 Luce makes speech to CoRAA 
conference in Newcastle 
Attack on the ‘welfare state mentality’ 
8 July 1987 
1988 Luce commissions review to Wilding Letter to Rees-Mogg, Chairman, ACGB 
8 Dec 1988 
1989 NAO provisional report to OAL Accountability questions, to be reviewed 
in light of the Wilding Report 
 
1989 Support for the Arts (Wilding Report) 
published by OAL 
18 Oct 1989 
 
1989 Responses to be received on the 
Wilding Report, Consultation Period 
 
31 Dec 1989 
1990 Luce announces changes 
 
 
House of Commons, Letter to Palumbo, 
Chairman of ACGB, 13 Mar 1990 
 
 
1990 Steering Group set up For implementation of Luce’s decision 
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1990 Office of Arts and Libraries: Review of 
the Arts Council of Great Britain 
National Audit Office 
 
1990 Speech by Luce at CoRAA conference  
 
On the Wilding Repor, 17 Jul 1990 
1990 Mellor appointed as the Minister 
 
24 July 1990 
1990 Working Group formed to set up a  
new systems for planning and 
accountability 
 
OAL, NABs, RAB, examining operational 
procedure 
1990 Mellor asks the AC to set up a Review 
Team 
Letter from Mellor to Palumbo,24 Sept 
1990 attempting to modify Luce’s 
decisions, report by Dec 1990 
 
1990 Review Team Report Examines the options for implementing 
structural reform of arts funding, 
unpublished 
 
1990 Renton decides on the restructuring of 
the arts funding system  
Statement at House of Commons, Letter to 
Palumbo, 19 Dec 1990 
1991 Report of the Planning and 
Accountability Working Group 
 
On operational procedure in the new arts 
funding system, March 1991 
1991 Incorporation of RABs For all RAAs by Aptil 1991 
1992 An initial group of clients delegated to 
RABs 
 
1 April 1992 
1992 Conditions of Financial Support : 
Regional Arts Board 
A note setting out the conditions under 
which the ACGB offers grant aid to 
RABs, May 1992 
 
1992 Brooke announces 42 clients for 
delegation 
Price Waterhouse review mentioned, 11 
Dec 1992 
1993 Brooke publishes Price Waterhouse 
Review of ACGB  structure 
3 main options for structural change of 
ACGB.  List of clients to be delegated and 
retained, 4 June 1993 
 
1994 Lord Gowrie appointed as Chairman of 
ACE 
Letter from the Minister emphasising 
harmonisation between ACE and RABs, 
22 Mar 1994 
 
1994 ACGB devolved to ACE, Scotland and 
Wales 
1 April 1994 
1994 Second stage delegation 
 
1 April 1994 
1995? The relationship between ACE and 
RABs 
Note to describe the relationship, signed 
on the date by Lord Gowrie and Robert 
Southgate, 18 May 1995 
 
 
Table 7.1 :  Features of the Theatres Surveyed 
 
 RSC Birmingham Rep Belgrade New Victoria The Swan 
Year 
Established 
18791 1913 1958  1956 1965
Remit National/Internationa
l 
Regional/National    Local/Regional Local/Regional Local/Regional
Location Small town and 
London 






































15085 890    862 605 353
No. of (new) 
Productions 
(17) 14 (4) 82 (7) 46 (2) 20 (1) 
No. of
attendance 
 1,221,444     158,000 131,000 93,500 49,000
                                                
1 Reopened in 1932 after a fire 
2 For the two bases including London 
3 Including sponsorship 
4 Approximate figures.  Some have a flexible seating plan. 






The only company 






 Historical relation 
with the City Council 
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